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The transaction costs driving captive power generation: Evidence from India

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  • Ghosh, Ranjan
  • Kathuria, Vinish

Abstract

The 2003 Indian Electricity Act incentivizes captive power production through open access in an attempt to harness all sources of generation. Yet, we observe that only some firms self-generate while others do not. In this paper we give a transaction cost explanation for such divergent behavior. Using a primary survey of 107 firms from India, we construct a distinct variable to measure the transaction-specificity of electricity use. The ‘make or buy’ decision is then econometrically tested using probit model. Results are highly responsive to transaction-specificity and the likelihood of captive power generation is positively related to it. At the industrial level, this explains why food and chemical firms are more likely to make their own electricity. Since the burden of poor grid supply is highest on smaller sized and high transaction-specific firms, the grid access policies need to account for firm-level characteristics if government wants to incentivize captive power generation.

Suggested Citation

  • Ghosh, Ranjan & Kathuria, Vinish, 2014. "The transaction costs driving captive power generation: Evidence from India," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 179-188.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:75:y:2014:i:c:p:179-188
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2014.10.003
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    Cited by:

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    3. Bolanos, Jose A., 2019. "Energy, uncertainty, and entrepreneurship: John D Rockefeller’s sequential approach to transaction costs management in the early oil industry," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 100852, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Kathuria, Vinish, 2021. "Impact of institutional reforms on the performance of distribution utilities in India – A dynamic panel data analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    5. Mehta, Tarun & Sarangi, Gopal K., 2022. "Is the electricity cross-subsidization policy in India caught between a rock and a hard place? An empirical investigation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    6. Ghosh, Ranjan & Kathuria, Vinish, 2016. "The effect of regulatory governance on efficiency of thermal power generation in India: A stochastic frontier analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 11-24.
    7. Ghosh, Ranjan & Goyal, Yugank & Rommel, Jens & Sagebiel, Julian, 2017. "Are small firms willing to pay for improved power supply? Evidence from a contingent valuation study in India," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 659-665.

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