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Regulatory capture by default: Offshore exploratory drilling for oil and gas

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  • Portman, Michelle E.

Abstract

This article examines a form of regulatory capture that occurs when significant ambiguity exists regarding the environmental protection standards for new types of activities in the marine environment. To begin with, there is little research that categorizes the typologies of regulatory capture despite the ubiquity of the phenomenon. After a discussion of theoretical approaches to regulatory capture, I describe the operative definition and theory appropriate to the situation related to authorization of oil and natural gas production in Israel following the discovery of large offshore reserves in 2010. This approach, embodying several facets of existing typologies, is applied to decisions made authorizing construction of the Gabriella offshore exploratory drilling platform. The analysis highlights the nature of capture in the absence of clear agency jurisdiction over new activities located in offshore environs organized as temporal and spatial “vacuums”. I conclude that comprehensive marine spatial planning would result in less capture and the development of more capture-resistant regulations.

Suggested Citation

  • Portman, Michelle E., 2014. "Regulatory capture by default: Offshore exploratory drilling for oil and gas," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 37-47.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:65:y:2014:i:c:p:37-47
    DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2013.10.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Bernardo Mueller & Carlos Pereira, 2002. "Credibility and the design of regulatory agencies in Brazil," Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Center of Political Economy, vol. 22(3), pages 449-472.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fry, Matthew & Brannstrom, Christian, 2017. "Emergent patterns and processes in urban hydrocarbon governance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 383-393.
    2. Portman, M.E., 2015. "Marine spatial planning in the Middle East: Crossing the policy-planning divide," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 8-15.
    3. Cory L. Struthers & Kathryn J. Murenbeeld & Matthew A. Williamson, 2023. "Environmental impact assessments not the main barrier to timely forest management in the United States," Nature Sustainability, Nature, vol. 6(12), pages 1542-1546, December.
    4. Yu Tu & Benhong Peng & Ehsan Elahi & Weiku Wu, 2020. "Initiator or Intermediary? A Case Study on Network Relation of Environmental Regulatory Capture in China," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(24), pages 1-19, December.
    5. Fischhendler, Itay & Nathan, Daniel, 2014. "In the name of energy security: the struggle over the exportation of Israeli natural gas," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 152-162.

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