IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/eneeco/v82y2019icp62-67.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Market deregulation and nuclear safety*

* This paper is a replication of an original study

Author

Listed:
  • Lei, Zhen
  • Tsai, Chen-Hao

Abstract

Nuclear reactor initiating events, which are unplanned reactor emergency shutdowns, are a primary measure of reactor safety performance. We call attention to several methodological and data issues in the emerging research endeavor that uses nuclear initiating events to investigate the impacts of electricity market deregulation on nuclear reactors' safety performance. Correcting these issues we find that the effects of plant divestiture on nuclear safety are much smaller in magnitude and less significant. Moreover, we find that when examining data prior to 2008 or excluding years 2008 and 2009 from analysis, the effect of plant divestiture on reactor initiating events becomes robustly insignificant.

Suggested Citation

  • Lei, Zhen & Tsai, Chen-Hao, 2019. "Market deregulation and nuclear safety," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 62-67.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:62-67
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.10.015
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140988317303560
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.eneco.2017.10.015?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucas W. Davis & Catherine Wolfram, 2012. "Deregulation, Consolidation, and Efficiency: Evidence from US Nuclear Power," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 194-225, October.
    2. Catherine Hausman, 2014. "Corporate Incentives and Nuclear Safety," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 178-206, August.
    3. Zhen Lei & Chen-Hao Tsai & Andrew N. Kleit, 2017. "Deregulation and Investment in Generation Capacity: Evidence from Nuclear Power Uprates in the United States," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    4. Fan Zhang, 2007. "Does Electricity Restructuring Work? Evidence From The U.S. Nuclear Energy Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 397-418, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Zhen Lei & Chen-Hao Tsai & Andrew N. Kleit, 2017. "Deregulation and Investment in Generation Capacity: Evidence from Nuclear Power Uprates in the United States," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    2. Alexander Hill, 2023. "Price freezes and gas pass-through: an estimation of the price impact of electricity market restructuring," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 87-116, April.
    3. Chu, Yin & Chang, Chun-Ping, 2020. "Vertical separation of transmission control and market efficiency in the wholesale electricity market," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    4. Karney, Daniel H., 2019. "Electricity market deregulation and environmental regulation: Evidence from U.S. nuclear power," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    5. Berthélemy Michel & Bonev Petyo & Dussaux Damien & Söderberg Magnus, 2019. "Methods for strengthening a weak instrument in the case of a persistent treatment," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 23(1), pages 1-30, February.
    6. Sven-Olof Fridolfsson and Thomas P. Tangeras, 2015. "Nuclear Capacity Auctions," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3).
    7. Linares, Pedro & Conchado, Adela, 2013. "The economics of new nuclear power plants in liberalized electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(S1), pages 119-125.
    8. Hausman, Catherine, 2019. "Comment: Market deregulation and nuclear safety," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 68-69.
    9. Seifert, Stefan & Cullmann, Astrid & von Hirschhausen, Christian, 2016. "Technical efficiency and CO2 reduction potentials — An analysis of the German electricity and heat generating sector," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 9-19.
    10. Bizet, Romain & Bonev, Petyo & Leveque, Francois, 2020. "The effect of local monitoring on nuclear safety and compliance: Evidence from France," Economics Working Paper Series 2014, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    11. Bernstein, David H. & Parmeter, Christopher F. & Tsionas, Mike G., 2023. "On the performance of the United States nuclear power sector: A Bayesian approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    12. Radygin, Alexander & Simachev, Yury & Entov, Revold, 2015. "The state-owned company: “State failure” or “market failure”?1," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 55-80.
    13. Lange, Ian & Maniloff, Peter, 2021. "Updating allowance allocations in cap-and-trade: Evidence from the NOx Budget Program," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    14. Bizet, Romain & Bonev, Petyo & Lévêque, François, 2022. "The effect of local monitoring on nuclear safety and compliance: Evidence from France," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    15. Jonathan E. Hughes & Ian Lange, 2020. "Who (Else) Benefits From Electricity Deregulation? Coal Prices, Natural Gas, And Price Discrimination," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(3), pages 1053-1075, July.
    16. Chan, H. Ron & Fell, Harrison & Lange, Ian & Li, Shanjun, 2017. "Efficiency and environmental impacts of electricity restructuring on coal-fired power plants," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 1-18.
    17. Adler, David B. & Jha, Akshaya & Severnini, Edson, 2020. "Considering the nuclear option: Hidden benefits and social costs of nuclear power in the U.S. since 1970," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    18. Bizet, Romain & Bonev, Petyo & Lévêque, François, 2022. "Are Older Nuclear Reactors Less Safe? Evidence from France," Economics Working Paper Series 2216, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    19. Stefan Seifert & Astrid Cullmann & Christian von Hirschhausen, 2014. "Technical Efficiency and CO2 Reduction Potentials: An Analysis of the German Electricity Generating Sector," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1426, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    20. Oliver, Matthew E., 2019. "Pricing flexibility under rate-of-return regulation: Effects on network infrastructure investment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 150-161.

    Replication

    This item is a replication of:
  • Catherine Hausman, 2014. "Corporate Incentives and Nuclear Safety," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 178-206, August.

    • More about this item

    Keywords

    Deregulation; Nuclear safety; Reactor initiating events;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities

    Lists

    This item is featured on the following reading lists, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki pages:
    1. Market deregulation and nuclear safety (Energy Economics 2019) in ReplicationWiki

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:82:y:2019:i:c:p:62-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eneco .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.