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Power marketer pricing behavior in the California Power Exchange

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  • Hodge, Tyler
  • Dahl, Carol A.

Abstract

Various studies have examined whether market power abuses by independent electricity generators contributed to the demise of the California Power Exchange (PX). However, the behavior of wholesale power marketers has generally been overlooked. To fill this gap, our paper focuses on the pricing behavior of five major power marketers in the California PX during 2000: Duke Energy Trading & Marketing, Reliant Energy Services, Dynegy Power Marketing, Enron Power Marketing, and Williams Energy Marketing & Trading. Our unique data set, collected by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission during an investigation of energy market pricing manipulation, allows us to assess the level of market power using the conduct parameter pricing model. The estimated conduct parameter allows us to determine power marketer pricing behavior is competitive, Cournot, or collusive. Our results indicate that Duke Energy and Reliant were exercising market power when pricing the wholesale electricity they sold in the California PX during 2000. No statistical evidence was uncovered to show that the smaller marketers – Dynegy, Williams and, Enron – were setting prices at a level higher than those consistent with a competitive market.

Suggested Citation

  • Hodge, Tyler & Dahl, Carol A., 2012. "Power marketer pricing behavior in the California Power Exchange," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 568-575.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eneeco:v:34:y:2012:i:2:p:568-575
    DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.05.003
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Tarek Atalla & Simona Bigerna & Carlo Andrea Bollino, 2018. "Energy demand elasticities and weather worldwide," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 35(1), pages 207-237, April.
    2. Carol A. Dahl & Tyler Hodge, 2012. "A dynamic conduct parameter model of electricity marketer pricing behavior in the California power exchange," Working Papers 2012-15, Colorado School of Mines, Division of Economics and Business.
    3. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Silveira, Douglas, 2023. "Screening for Collusion in Wholesale Electricity Markets: A Review of the Literature," Working Papers 2023-7, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    4. Fan, Qingju, 2016. "Asymmetric multiscale detrended fluctuation analysis of California electricity spot price," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 442(C), pages 252-260.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Power; Marketer; Pricing; Electricity; Wholesale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L19 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Other
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • Q49 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Other

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