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Do share repurchases facilitate movement toward target capital structure? International evidence

Author

Listed:
  • Wang, Zigan
  • Yin, Qie Ellie
  • Yu, Luping

Abstract

We use a new international setting to test and strengthen identification of the “target leverage” hypothesis in the payout policy literature. We conduct a quasi-natural experiment induced by staggered share repurchase legalization in 17 economies and analyze its influences on leverage dynamics. After controlling for other repurchasing motives, firms under-leveraged before legalization are more likely to buy back shares immediately after legalization. Post-legalization repurchases also facilitate firms’ movement toward target leverage, especially when firms are under-leveraged. This facilitating effect is stronger under lower repurchasing restriction, higher dividend tax penalty, and lower financial constraint.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Zigan & Yin, Qie Ellie & Yu, Luping, 2024. "Do share repurchases facilitate movement toward target capital structure? International evidence," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:empfin:v:77:y:2024:i:c:s0927539824000331
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2024.101498
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    Keywords

    Share repurchases; Capital structure; Target leverage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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