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Communication and financial supervision: How does disclosure affect market stability?

Author

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  • Pacicco, Fausto
  • Vena, Luigi
  • Venegoni, Andrea

Abstract

The impact of authorities’ information disclosure on social welfare and market stability has become a widely debated topic since the contribution of Morris and Shin (2002). Despite several theoretical works, this strand of literature remains void of empirical contributions. By assessing how disclosure of stress test results influences market risk perception, we provide factual evidence on how authorities’ enhanced communication affects financial markets’ stability. Our results provide empirical evidence to support Faria-e-Castro et al.’s (2017) theoretical findings, demonstrating that severe stress tests, if enacted in countries with credible fiscal capacity such as the U.S., can lead agents to revise their risk estimations downwards for all banks, notwithstanding their performance in the exercise.

Suggested Citation

  • Pacicco, Fausto & Vena, Luigi & Venegoni, Andrea, 2020. "Communication and financial supervision: How does disclosure affect market stability?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 1-15.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:empfin:v:57:y:2020:i:c:p:1-15
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2020.01.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Disclosure policy; Risk assessment; Market reaction; State-space model; Stress test;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes; State Space Models
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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