IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ememar/v38y2019icp1-17.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Corruption and cash holdings: Evidence from emerging market economies

Author

Listed:
  • Thakur, Bhanu Pratap Singh
  • Kannadhasan, M.

Abstract

We examine the effect of corruption on cash holdings and cash value using a panel data set of 4236 firms from 16 emerging market economies. We find that the cash holdings are positively related to the corruption and by managing their cash holdings upwards, the firms can benefit in the corrupt environment by trading cash. Furthermore, cash holding adds value to the firms. However, it is insignificant when the firms are operating in high corruption environment with low investor protection. Overall, the evidence suggests that corruption play an important role in shaping the cash policies of firms in emerging markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Thakur, Bhanu Pratap Singh & Kannadhasan, M., 2019. "Corruption and cash holdings: Evidence from emerging market economies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 1-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:38:y:2019:i:c:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2018.11.008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1566014118302887
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ememar.2018.11.008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    2. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
    3. Merton H. Miller & Daniel Orr, 1966. "A Model of the Demand for Money by Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 80(3), pages 413-435.
    4. Gao, Huasheng & Harford, Jarrad & Li, Kai, 2013. "Determinants of corporate cash policy: Insights from private firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(3), pages 623-639.
    5. Claessens, Stijn & Feijen, Erik & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Political connections and preferential access to finance: The role of campaign contributions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3), pages 554-580, June.
    6. Lee Pinkowitz & René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 2006. "Does the Contribution of Corporate Cash Holdings and Dividends to Firm Value Depend on Governance? A Cross‐country Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2725-2751, December.
    7. Hall, Thomas & Mateus, Cesario & Mateus, Irina Bezhentseva, 2014. "What determines cash holdings at privately held and publicly traded firms? Evidence from 20 emerging markets," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 104-116.
    8. Kovenock, Dan & Phillips, Gordon M, 1997. "Capital Structure and Product Market Behavior: An Examination of Plant Exit and Investment Decisions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(3), pages 767-803.
    9. Dittmar, Amy & Mahrt-Smith, Jan & Servaes, Henri, 2003. "International Corporate Governance and Corporate Cash Holdings," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 111-133, March.
    10. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay & Massimo Mastruzzi, 2006. "Measuring Governance Using Cross-Country Perceptions Data," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    11. Thomas W. Bates & Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, 2009. "Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 1985-2021, October.
    12. de Jong, Abe & Kabir, Rezaul & Nguyen, Thuy Thu, 2008. "Capital structure around the world: The roles of firm- and country-specific determinants," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1954-1969, September.
    13. Tahoun, Ahmed, 2014. "The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 86-110.
    14. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, June.
    15. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 1999. "Institutions, financial markets, and firm debt maturity," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 295-336, December.
    16. Michael Faulkender & Rong Wang, 2006. "Corporate Financial Policy and the Value of Cash," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1957-1990, August.
    17. René M. Stulz, 2007. "The Limits of Financial Globalization," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 19(1), pages 8-15, January.
    18. Ozkan, Aydin & Ozkan, Neslihan, 2004. "Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(9), pages 2103-2134, September.
    19. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December.
    20. Opler, Tim & Pinkowitz, Lee & Stulz, Rene & Williamson, Rohan, 1999. "The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 3-46, April.
    21. Mitchell A. Petersen, 2009. "Estimating Standard Errors in Finance Panel Data Sets: Comparing Approaches," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(1), pages 435-480, January.
    22. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    23. Klasa, Sandy & Maxwell, William F. & Ortiz-Molina, Hernán, 2009. "The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3), pages 421-442, June.
    24. William J. Baumol, 1952. "The Transactions Demand for Cash: An Inventory Theoretic Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 66(4), pages 545-556.
    25. Black, Bernard S. & de Carvalho, Antonio Gledson & Gorga, Érica, 2012. "What matters and for which firms for corporate governance in emerging markets? Evidence from Brazil (and other BRIK countries)," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 934-952.
    26. Duchin, Ran & Sosyura, Denis, 2012. "The politics of government investment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 24-48.
    27. Seifert, Bruce & Gonenc, Halit, 2018. "The effects of country and firm-level governance on cash management," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1-16.
    28. Elizabeth Asiedu & James Freeman, 2009. "The Effect of Corruption on Investment Growth: Evidence from Firms in Latin America, Sub‐Saharan Africa, and Transition Countries," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 200-214, May.
    29. Smith, Jared D., 2016. "US political corruption and firm financial policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 350-367.
    30. Fritz Foley, C. & Hartzell, Jay C. & Titman, Sheridan & Twite, Garry, 2007. "Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based explanation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(3), pages 579-607, December.
    31. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    32. Laurent Fresard, 2010. "Financial Strength and Product Market Behavior: The Real Effects of Corporate Cash Holdings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(3), pages 1097-1122, June.
    33. Lorenzo Caprio & Mara Faccio & John J. McConnell, 2013. "Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(2), pages 332-354, April.
    34. Gerard Hoberg & Gordon Phillips & Nagpurnanand Prabhala, 2014. "Product Market Threats, Payouts, and Financial Flexibility," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 69(1), pages 293-324, February.
    35. Ivalina Kalcheva & Karl V. Lins, 2007. "International Evidence on Cash Holdings and Expected Managerial Agency Problems," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(4), pages 1087-1112.
    36. Pedro J. García-Teruel & Pedro Martínez-Solano, 2008. "On the Determinants of SME Cash Holdings: Evidence from Spain," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1-2), pages 127-149.
    37. Mr. Erwin H Tiongson & Mr. Hamid R Davoodi & Mr. Sanjeev Gupta, 2000. "Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services," IMF Working Papers 2000/116, International Monetary Fund.
    38. Kim, Chang-Soo & Mauer, David C. & Sherman, Ann E., 1998. "The Determinants of Corporate Liquidity: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(3), pages 335-359, September.
    39. Chen, Minghua & Wu, Ji & Jeon, Bang Nam & Wang, Rui, 2017. "Monetary policy and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 116-140.
    40. Dittmar, Amy & Mahrt-Smith, Jan, 2007. "Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 599-634, March.
    41. Jarrad Harford & Kai Li & Xinlei Zhao, 2008. "Corporate boards and the leverage and debt maturity choices," International Journal of Corporate Governance, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 3-27.
    42. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
    43. Christof Beuselinck & Yan Du, 2017. "Determinants of Cash Holdings in Multinational Corporation's Foreign Subsidiaries: US Subsidiaries in China," Post-Print hal-01745240, HAL.
    44. Demir, Ender & Ersan, Oguz, 2017. "Economic policy uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from BRIC countries," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 189-200.
    45. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025.
    46. Lins, Karl V. & Servaes, Henri & Tufano, Peter, 2010. "What drives corporate liquidity? An international survey of cash holdings and lines of credit," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 160-176, October.
    47. Laurent Fresard, 2010. "Financial Strength and Product Market Behavior: The Real Effects of Corporate Cash Holdings," Post-Print hal-00537081, HAL.
    48. Pedro J. García‐Teruel & Pedro Martínez‐Solano, 2008. "On the Determinants of SME Cash Holdings: Evidence from Spain," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1‐2), pages 127-149, January.
    49. MARA FACCIO & RONALD W. MASULIS & JOHN J. McCONNELL, 2006. "Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(6), pages 2597-2635, December.
    50. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    51. Haushalter, David & Klasa, Sandy & Maxwell, William F., 2007. "The influence of product market dynamics on a firm's cash holdings and hedging behavior," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 797-825, June.
    52. Fan, Joseph P. H. & Titman, Sheridan & Twite, Garry, 2012. "An International Comparison of Capital Structure and Debt Maturity Choices," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(1), pages 23-56, February.
    53. Mohamed Ghaly & Viet Anh Dang & Konstantinos Stathopoulos, 2017. "Cash Holdings and Labor Heterogeneity: The Role of Skilled Labor," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(10), pages 3636-3668.
    54. Awartani, Basel & Belkhir, Mohamed & Boubaker, Sabri & Maghyereh, Aktham, 2016. "Corporate debt maturity in the MENA region: Does institutional quality matter?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 309-325.
    55. Raymond Fisman, 2001. "Estimating the Value of Political Connections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1095-1102, September.
    56. Chen, Minghua & Jeon, Bang Nam & Wang, Rui & Wu, Ji, 2015. "Corruption and bank risk-taking: Evidence from emerging economies," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 122-148.
    57. Ararat, Melsa & Black, Bernard S. & Yurtoglu, B. Burcin, 2017. "The effect of corporate governance on firm value and profitability: Time-series evidence from Turkey," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 113-132.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Singh, Bhanu Pratap & Kannadhasan, M., 2020. "Corruption and capital structure in emerging markets: A panel quantile regression approach," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C).
    2. Tran, Quoc Trung, 2020. "Corruption and corporate cash holdings: international evidence," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    3. Smith, Jared D., 2016. "US political corruption and firm financial policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 350-367.
    4. Park, SeHyun, 2022. "Liquid asset sheltering, or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    5. Cai, Weixing & Hu, Feng & Xu, Fangming & Zheng, Liyi, 2022. "Anti-corruption campaign and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(PA).
    6. Li, Xiaodan & Pan, Zikui & Ho, Kung-Cheng & Bo, Yu, 2024. "Epidemics, local institutional quality, and corporate cash holdings," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 193-210.
    7. Amess, Kevin & Banerji, Sanjay & Lampousis, Athanasios, 2015. "Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 421-433.
    8. Maurizio Rocca & Raffaele Staglianò & Tiziana Rocca & Alfio Cariola & Ekaterina Skatova, 2019. "Cash holdings and SME performance in Europe: the role of firm-specific and macroeconomic moderators," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1051-1078, December.
    9. Javadi, Siamak & Mollagholamali, Mohsen & Nejadmalayeri, Ali & Al-Thaqeb, Saud, 2021. "Corporate cash holdings, agency problems, and economic policy uncertainty," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    10. Hou, Canran & Liu, Huan, 2020. "Foreign residency rights and corporate cash holdings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    11. Chang, Ching-Hung & Chen, Sheng-Syan & Chen, Yan-Shing & Peng, Shu-Cing, 2019. "Commitment to build trust by socially responsible firms: Evidence from cash holdings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 364-387.
    12. Hsuan-Chu Lin & She-Chih Chiu, 2017. "Tradeoff on corporate cash holdings: a theoretical and empirical analysis," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 727-763, October.
    13. Alomran, Abdulaziz Ahmed & Alsubaiei, Bader Jawid, 2022. "Oil price uncertainty and corporate cash holdings: Global evidence," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    14. Chen, Yangyang & Dou, Paul Y. & Rhee, S. Ghon & Truong, Cameron & Veeraraghavan, Madhu, 2015. "National culture and corporate cash holdings around the world," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 1-18.
    15. Heitor Almeida & Murillo Campello & Igor Cunha & Michael S. Weisbach, 2014. "Corporate Liquidity Management: A Conceptual Framework and Survey," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 135-162, December.
    16. Adão, Bernardino & Silva, André C., 2020. "The effect of firm cash holdings on monetary policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    17. Xu, Nianhang & Chen, Qinyuan & Xu, Yan & Chan, Kam C., 2016. "Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 276-295.
    18. Feng, Xunan & Johansson, Anders C., 2014. "Escaping political extraction: Political participation, institutions, and cash holdings in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 98-112.
    19. Paulo, Alves, 2018. "Abnormal retained earnings around the world," Journal of Multinational Financial Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 63-74.
    20. Mortal, Sandra & Nanda, Vikram & Reisel, Natalia, 2020. "Why do private firms hold less cash than public firms? International evidence on cash holdings and borrowing costs," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Cash holdings; Emerging markets; Value of cash;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:38:y:2019:i:c:p:1-17. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620356 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.