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Having the wrong friends at the wrong time: Effects of political turmoil on politically-connected firms

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  • Dang, Vinh Q.T.
  • So, Erin P.K.

Abstract

We examine effects of political turmoil on equity return, risk, and corporate governance of politically-connected firms in Egypt. Political strife leads to shifts in the balance of power among different factions. Our analysis shows that equity risk of firms connected to fractions encountering intense political rivalry and public discontent rose, without any compensating increase in return. Political tie that is neutral to regime changes exhibits lower risk. By examining agency-cost measures in different regimes, we find that political instability may exert disciplinary effects on connected shareholders' behavior. In our sample, expropriation in the connected firms became subdued during Egypt's unrest.

Suggested Citation

  • Dang, Vinh Q.T. & So, Erin P.K., 2018. "Having the wrong friends at the wrong time: Effects of political turmoil on politically-connected firms," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 79-94.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ememar:v:36:y:2018:i:c:p:79-94
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ememar.2018.03.005
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political connection; Risk; Liability; Expropriation; Political turmoil;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • O53 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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