IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v278y2019i1p160-169.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Using weight decision for decreasing the price of anarchy in selfish bin packing games

Author

Listed:
  • Dosa, Gyorgy
  • Kellerer, Hans
  • Tuza, Zsolt

Abstract

A selfish bin packing game is a variant of the classical bin packing problem in a game theoretic setting. In our model the items have not only a size but also a nonnegative weight. Each item plays the role of a selfish agent, and any agent/item pays some cost for being in a bin. The cost of a bin is 1, and this cost is shared among the items being in the bin, proportionally to their weight. A packing of the items into bins is called a Nash equilibrium if no item can decrease its cost by moving to another bin. In this paper we present two different settings for the weights which provide better values for the price of anarchy (PoA) than previous settings investigated so far. The improved PoA is not bigger than 16/11 ≈ 1.4545. Moreover, we give a general lower bound for the price of anarchy which holds for all possible choices of the weights.

Suggested Citation

  • Dosa, Gyorgy & Kellerer, Hans & Tuza, Zsolt, 2019. "Using weight decision for decreasing the price of anarchy in selfish bin packing games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 278(1), pages 160-169.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:278:y:2019:i:1:p:160-169
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377221719303601
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.04.026?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Xin Chen & Qingqin Nong & Qizhi Fang, 0. "An improved mechanism for selfish bin packing," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-21.
    2. Ruixin Ma & György Dósa & Xin Han & Hing-Fung Ting & Deshi Ye & Yong Zhang, 2013. "A note on a selfish bin packing problem," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1457-1462, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kameda, Hisao, 2021. "Magnitude of inefficiency," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 292(3), pages 1133-1145.
    2. Chenhao Zhang & Guochuan Zhang, 0. "From packing rules to cost-sharing mechanisms," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
    3. Chenhao Zhang & Guochuan Zhang, 2022. "From packing rules to cost-sharing mechanisms," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1578-1593, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chenhao Zhang & Guochuan Zhang, 0. "From packing rules to cost-sharing mechanisms," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
    2. Vittorio Bilò & Francesco Cellinese & Giovanna Melideo & Gianpiero Monaco, 0. "Selfish colorful bin packing games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-26.
    3. Xin Chen & Qingqin Nong & Qizhi Fang, 2021. "An improved mechanism for selfish bin packing," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 42(3), pages 636-656, October.
    4. György Dósa & Leah Epstein, 2019. "Quality of strong equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing," Journal of Scheduling, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 473-485, August.
    5. Vittorio Bilò & Francesco Cellinese & Giovanna Melideo & Gianpiero Monaco, 2020. "Selfish colorful bin packing games," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 40(3), pages 610-635, October.
    6. Q. Q. Nong & T. Sun & T. C. E. Cheng & Q. Z. Fang, 2018. "Bin packing game with a price of anarchy of $$\frac{3}{2}$$ 3 2," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 632-640, February.
    7. György Dósa & Leah Epstein, 2019. "Pareto optimal equilibria for selfish bin packing with uniform cost sharing," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 827-847, April.
    8. Xin Chen & Qingqin Nong & Qizhi Fang, 0. "An improved mechanism for selfish bin packing," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-21.
    9. Chenhao Zhang & Guochuan Zhang, 2022. "From packing rules to cost-sharing mechanisms," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1578-1593, October.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:278:y:2019:i:1:p:160-169. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.