IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ejores/v171y2006i3p1005-1019.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Bid calculation for construction projects: Regulations and incentive effects of unit price contracts

Author

Listed:
  • Missbauer, Hubert
  • Hauber, Wolfgang

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Missbauer, Hubert & Hauber, Wolfgang, 2006. "Bid calculation for construction projects: Regulations and incentive effects of unit price contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 171(3), pages 1005-1019, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:171:y:2006:i:3:p:1005-1019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0377-2217(05)00123-2
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin, 2001. "Information and Competition in U.S. Forest Service Timber Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 375-417, April.
    2. Ewerhart, Christian & Fieseler, Karsten, 2003. "Procurement Auctions and Unit-Price Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 569-581, Autumn.
    3. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
    4. Teresa M. Pavia, 1995. "Profit Maximizing Cost Allocation for Firms Using Cost-Based Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(6), pages 1060-1072, June.
    5. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zeng, Nengmin & Wu, Guangdong & Zeng, Dongling & Liu, Ang & Ren, Tinghai & Liu, Bingsheng, 2023. "Optimal mechanism for project splitting with time cost and asymmetric information," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
    2. Ivona Ivić & Anita Cerić, 2023. "Risks Caused by Information Asymmetry in Construction Projects: A Systematic Literature Review," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(13), pages 1-25, June.
    3. Sander Renes, 2011. "Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-047/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    4. Ivona Ivić & Anita Cerić, 2024. "Mitigation Measures for Information Asymmetry between Participants in Construction Projects: The Impact of Trust," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 16(16), pages 1-27, August.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Barbosa, Klenio, 2009. "Free Riding in Procurement Design," TSE Working Papers 09-128, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    2. Sander Renes, 2011. "Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-047/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    3. Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari, 2014. "Moral Hazard, Incentive Contracts, and Risk: Evidence from Procurement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(3), pages 1201-1228.
    4. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano Castro & Humberto Moreira, 2008. "Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(3), pages 407-440, June.
    5. Brett Katzman & Kerry Anne McGeary, 2008. "Will Competitive Bidding Decrease Medicare Prices?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 74(3), pages 839-856, January.
    6. Moreira, Humberto Ataíde & Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Castro Filho, Luciano I. de, 2004. "Pure strategy equilibria of multidimensional and non-monotonic auctions," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 571, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
    7. Zhang, Juliang & Xiang, Jie & Cheng, T.C. Edwin & Hua, Guowei & Chen, Cheng, 2019. "An optimal efficient multi-attribute auction for transportation procurement with carriers having multi-unit supplies," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 249-260.
    8. Paul H. Jensen & Robin E. Stonecash, 2005. "Contract Efficiency in the Presence of Demand and Cost Uncertainty," Melbourne Institute Working Paper Series wp2005n01, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne.
    9. Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Carlos Lamarche, 2015. "Project modifications and bidding in highway procurement auctions," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2015-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    10. Svante Mandell & Johan Nyström, 2013. "Too Much Balance in Unbalanced Bidding," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 1(1), pages 23-35, June.
    11. Mandell, Svante & Nyström, Johan, 2011. "Why are bids not more unbalanced?," Working papers in Transport Economics 2011:13, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    12. Sunnevag, Kjell J., 2002. "Auctions combined with ex post taxation--expected revenue when three parties want a piece of the cake," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 49-59.
    13. Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2023. "Aftermarket Welfare and Procurement Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 23-081/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Jianqing Chen & Lizhen Xu & Andrew Whinston, 2010. "Managing Project Failure Risk Through Contingent Contracts in Procurement Auctions," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 23-39, March.
    15. Nyström, Johan & Wikström, Daniel, 2019. "Empirical analysis of unbalanced bidding on Swedish roads," Working Papers 2019:4, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    16. De Liu & Jianqing Chen & Andrew B. Whinston, 2010. "Ex Ante Information and the Design of Keyword Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 21(1), pages 133-153, March.
    17. François MARECHAL, 2003. "Should we base procurement rules on the competition of linear incentive contracts ?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 03.07, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    18. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85, March.
    19. Lansdowne, Z. F., 1996. "Extensions of bidding theory: Concealed bidding, optimal number of bidders, and follow-on contracts," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 107-114, February.
    20. Andrés Fioriti & Allan Hernandez-Chanto, 2022. "Leveling the Playing Field for Risk-Averse Agents in Security-Bid Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5441-5463, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:171:y:2006:i:3:p:1005-1019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eor .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.