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The allocation of shared fixed costs

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  • Butler, Martin
  • Williams, H. Paul

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  • Butler, Martin & Williams, H. Paul, 2006. "The allocation of shared fixed costs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 170(2), pages 391-397, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:170:y:2006:i:2:p:391-397
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Shubik, 1962. "Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 8(3), pages 325-343, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karsu, Özlem & Morton, Alec, 2015. "Inequity averse optimization in operational research," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 245(2), pages 343-359.
    2. Bugarinovic, Mirjana & Boskovic, Branislav, 2015. "A systems approach to access charges in unbundling railways," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 240(3), pages 848-860.
    3. Argyris, Nikolaos & Karsu, Özlem & Yavuz, Mirel, 2022. "Fair resource allocation: Using welfare-based dominance constraints," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 297(2), pages 560-578.

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