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Simple probability models for project contracting

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  • Paul, Anand
  • Gutierrez, Genaro

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  • Paul, Anand & Gutierrez, Genaro, 2005. "Simple probability models for project contracting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 165(2), pages 329-338, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ejores:v:165:y:2005:i:2:p:329-338
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bajari, Patrick & Tadelis, Steven, 2001. "Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 387-407, Autumn.
    2. Elmaghraby, Salah E., 1990. "Project bidding under deterministic and probabilistic activity durations," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 14-34, November.
    3. Jorgensen, Trond & Wallace, Stein W., 2000. "Improving project cost estimation by taking into account managerial flexibility," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 127(2), pages 239-251, December.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    5. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 326-338, Autumn.
    6. William Samuelson, 1986. "Bidding for Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 32(12), pages 1533-1550, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carden, Robert & Leach, Sonia E. & Smith, Jeffrey S., 2008. "A market reaction to DOD contract delay -- Does the market reward poor performance," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 33-45.
    2. Robert Carden & Sonia E. Leach & Jeffrey S. Smith, 2008. "A market reaction to DOD contract delay — Does the market reward poor performance?," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 33-45.
    3. Jiao Wang & Kai Yang & Ruiqing Zhao, 2017. "The impact of decision criteria on deadline-based incentive contracts in project management," Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 643-655, March.
    4. Dharma Kwon, H. & Lippman, Steven A. & Tang, Christopher S., 2011. "Sourcing decisions of project tasks with exponential completion times: Impact on operating profits," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 138-150, November.
    5. Shi Chen & Hau Lee, 2017. "Incentive Alignment and Coordination of Project Supply Chains," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(4), pages 1011-1025, April.
    6. Shi Chen & Ted Klastorin & Michael R. Wagner, 2021. "Designing practical coordinating contracts in decentralized projects," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 68(2), pages 183-198, March.
    7. Mimović Predrag & Krstić Ana, 2016. "Application of Multi-Criteria Analysis in the Public Procurement Process Optimization," Economic Themes, Sciendo, vol. 54(1), pages 103-128, March.
    8. Hensher, David A. & Ho, Chinh & Knowles, Louise, 2016. "Efficient contracting and incentive agreements between regulators and bus operators: The influence of risk preferences of contracting agents on contract choice," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 22-40.

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