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Team production, endogenous learning about abilities and career concerns

Author

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  • Chalioti, Evangelia

Abstract

This paper studies career concerns in teams where the support a worker receives depends on fellow team members׳ efforts and abilities. In this setting, by exerting effort and providing support, a worker can influence her own and her teammates׳ project outputs in order to bias the learning process in her favor. To manipulate the market׳s assessment, we argue that in equilibrium, a worker has incentives to help or even sabotage her colleagues in order to signal that she is of higher ability. In a multiperiod stationary framework, we show that the stationary level of work effort is above and help effort is below their efficient levels.

Suggested Citation

  • Chalioti, Evangelia, 2016. "Team production, endogenous learning about abilities and career concerns," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 229-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:85:y:2016:i:c:p:229-244
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.01.007
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Paula Onuchic & Debraj Ray, 2023. "Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(1), pages 210-252, January.
    2. Hakenes, Hendrik & Katolnik, Svetlana, 2017. "On the incentive effects of job rotation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 424-441.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Career concerns; Team incentives; Incentives to help; incentives to sabotage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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