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Determinants of contract length in franchise contracts

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  • Vazquez, Luis

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  • Vazquez, Luis, 2007. "Determinants of contract length in franchise contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 145-150, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:97:y:2007:i:2:p:145-150
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
    2. Brickley, James A. & Dark, Frederick H., 1987. "The choice of organizational form The case of franchising," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 401-420, June.
    3. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October.
    4. Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, 1988. "Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract Length," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 327-343, Autumn.
    5. Francine Lafontaine, 1992. "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 263-283, Summer.
    6. Scott Shane, 2001. "Organizational Incentives and Organizational Mortality," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 136-160, April.
    7. Rubin, Paul H, 1978. "The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(1), pages 223-233, April.
    8. Joskow, Paul L, 1987. "Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(1), pages 168-185, March.
    9. Brickley, James A & Dark, Frederick H & Weisbach, Michael S, 1991. "The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Laws," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 101-132, April.
    10. Howard Beales, J. III & Muris, Timothy J., 1995. "The foundations of franchise regulation: Issues and evidence," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 2(1-2), pages 157-197, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Chia Sun, 2014. "A conceptual framework for R&D strategic alliance assessment for Taiwan’s biotechnology industry," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 48(1), pages 259-279, January.
    2. Freiwald, Nisa E. & Juranek, Steffen & Walz, Uwe, 2020. "On the economic geography of dual distribution — The case of McDonald’s in Germany," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    3. Qu, Yingge & Kumar, V. & Zhao, Yi, 2023. "A dynamic model of the contract length and early termination: The roles of technology evolution and pricing strategy," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    4. Chih‐Ning Chu & Wai‐Man Liu, 2010. "General Equilibrium Analysis Of Hold‐Up Problem And Non‐Exclusive Franchise Contract," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 674-684, December.

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