IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v96y2007i2p183-188.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Hausken, Kjell

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "The impact of the future in games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 96(2), pages 183-188, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:96:y:2007:i:2:p:183-188
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(06)00451-4
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    2. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    3. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 1994. "A Course in Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262650401, April.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hausken, Kjell, 2007. "Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 138-144, November.
    2. Nuh Aygün Dalkıran, 2016. "Order of limits in reputations," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 81(3), pages 393-411, September.
    3. Janvier D. Nkurunziza, 2005. "Reputation and Credit without Collateral in Africa`s Formal Banking," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/2005-02, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Jon Olaf Olaussen, 2006. "Playing Chicken with Salmon," Working Paper Series 7406, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    5. Singhal, Monica, 2008. "Special interest groups and the allocation of public funds," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 548-564, April.
    6. Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise, 2015. "Bayesian repeated games and reputation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 70-104.
    7. Steven Brams & D. Kilgour, 1998. "Backward Induction Is Not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 263-289, December.
    8. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Yang, Bill Z., 1996. "Learning, reputation and entry deterrence: A chain-store game with correlated entrants," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 561-573, July.
    10. Du, Chuang, 2012. "Solving payoff sets of perfect public equilibria: an example," MPRA Paper 38622, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. K. Schmidt, 1999. "Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of Conflicting Interests," Levine's Working Paper Archive 626, David K. Levine.
    12. Martin W. Cripps & George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson, 2004. "Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 407-432, March.
    13. Mahmoud Elamin, 2015. "Can Reputation Ensure Efficiency in the Structured Finance Market? Majority Voting: A Quantitative Investigation," Working Papers (Old Series) 1441, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    14. Carmen Beviá & Luis C. Corchón & Yosuke Yasuda, 2020. "Oligopolistic equilibrium and financial constraints," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(1), pages 279-300, March.
    15. Dilip Abreu & David G. Pearce, 2006. "Reputational Wars of Attrition with Complex Bargaining Postures," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001218, David K. Levine.
    16. Argenton, Cédric, 2019. "Colluding on excluding," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 194-206.
    17. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
    18. D. Abreu & D. Pearce, 2000. "Bargaining, Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 00f2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    19. Melkonian, Tigran A., 1998. "Two essays on reputation effects in economic models," ISU General Staff Papers 1998010108000012873, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    20. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2012. "Foundations of trust, interpersonal relationships and communities," Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, vol. 120(3), pages 295-312.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:96:y:2007:i:2:p:183-188. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.