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Market structure and the allocation of R&D expenditures

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  • Kato, Atsushi

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  • Kato, Atsushi, 2005. "Market structure and the allocation of R&D expenditures," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 55-59, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:87:y:2005:i:1:p:55-59
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sudipto Bhattacharya & Dilip Mookherjee, 1986. "Portfolio Choice in Research and Development," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 594-605, Winter.
    2. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(387), pages 581-595, September.
    3. Glenn C. Loury, 1979. "Market Structure and Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(3), pages 395-410.
    4. Tor Klette & David de Meza, 1986. "Is the Market Biased Against Risky R&D?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 133-139, Spring.
    5. Aghion, Philippe & Howitt, Peter, 1996. "Research and Development in the Growth Process," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 49-73, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yan Zhao & Hui Sun & Xuechao Xia & Dianyuan Ma, 2023. "Can R&D Intensity Reduce Carbon Emissions Intensity? Evidence from China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(2), pages 1-24, January.

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