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Vertical tax externalities and the composition of public spending in a federation

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  • Wigger, Berthold U.
  • Wartha, Udo

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  • Wigger, Berthold U. & Wartha, Udo, 2004. "Vertical tax externalities and the composition of public spending in a federation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 357-361, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:84:y:2004:i:3:p:357-361
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Edwards, Jeremy & Keen, Michael, 1996. "Tax competition and Leviathan," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 113-134, January.
    2. Bev Dahlby, 1996. "Fiscal externalities and the design of intergovernmental grants," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 3(3), pages 397-412, July.
    3. Michael Keen, 1998. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 45(3), pages 454-485, September.
    4. Marilyn R. Flowers, 1988. "Shared Tax Sources in a Leviathan Model of Federalism," Public Finance Review, , vol. 16(1), pages 67-77, January.
    5. Michael J. Keen & Christos Kotsogiannis, 2002. "Does Federalism Lead to Excessively High Taxes?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(1), pages 363-370, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lisa Tillmann & Berthold U. Wigger, 2012. "Federal TAX Competition – How does the Institutional Structure of a Country change Tax Outcomes?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 59(2), pages 162-178, May.
    2. Pi, Jiancai & Zhou, Yu, 2014. "Tax competition in federations revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 104-107.
    3. Boggio, Margherita, 2011. "Municipal capitalism, regulatory federalism and politics," MPRA Paper 46244, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Alena Andrejovska, 2019. "Effective Tax Rate in the Context of the Economic Determinants," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 15(2), pages 31-40.

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