Cost-reducing horizontal mergers that leave prices unchanged in models of spatial competition
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990.
"Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
- Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt0tp305nx, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
- Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring.
- Werden, Gregory J, 1996.
"A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of Differentiated Products,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 409-413, December.
- Werden, G.J., 1996. "A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of Differentiated Products," Papers 96-01, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Ralph M. Braid, 1987. "The Spatial Incidence of Local Retail Taxation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(4), pages 881-891.
- Froeb, Luke M. & Werden, Gregory J., 1998.
"A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of a homogeneous product,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 367-369, March.
- Froeb, L.M. & Werden, G.J., 1997. "A Robust test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers Among Sellers of a Homogeneous Product," Papers 97-1, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Novshek, William, 1980. "Equilibrium in simple spatial (or differentiated product) models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 313-326, April.
- Martin J. Beckmann, 1972. "Spatial Cournot Oligopoly," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 37-48, January.
- Capozza, Dennis R & Van Order, Robert, 1977. "Pricing under Spatial Competition and Spatial Monopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(6), pages 1329-1338, September.
- Braid, Ralph M., 1999. "The price and profit effects of horizontal mergers in two-dimensional spatial competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 113-119, January.
- Braid, Ralph M., 1986. "Stackelberg price leadership in spatial competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 439-449, December.
- Economides, Nicholas, 1989. "Symmetric equilibrium existence and optimality in differentiated product markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 178-194, February.
- Levy, David T & Reitzes, James D, 1992. "Anticompetitive Effects of Mergers in Markets with Localized Competition," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 427-440, April.
- B. Curtis Eaton & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 1985. "Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(2), pages 282-297, Summer.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Ralph M. Braid, 2017. "Efficiency-enhancing horizontal mergers in spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 881-894, November.
- Ralph M. Braid, 2016. "Potential merger-forcing entry reduces maximum spacing between firms in spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 653-669, August.
- Brito, Duarte, 2003. "Preemptive mergers under spatial competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1601-1622, December.
- Brito, Duarte, 2005. "Should alternative mergers or acquisitions be considered by antitrust authorities?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 129-153, February.
- Zouhaier M'Chirgui & Walid Hichri, 2006. "Horizontal merger in bilaterally duopolistic industries with differentiated products," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(2), pages 93-95.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ralph M. Braid, 2017. "Efficiency-enhancing horizontal mergers in spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 96(4), pages 881-894, November.
- Ralph M. Braid, 2016. "Potential merger-forcing entry reduces maximum spacing between firms in spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 95(3), pages 653-669, August.
- Braid, Ralph M., 1998. "Spatial price competition when stores are not certain to have what consumers want," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 143-161, March.
- Braid, Ralph M., 1999. "The price and profit effects of horizontal mergers in two-dimensional spatial competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 113-119, January.
- Eric Giraud‐Héraud & Hakim Hammoudi & Mahdi Mokrane, 2003. "Multiproduct firm behaviour in a differentiated market," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(1), pages 41-61, March.
- Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, 2015.
"On The Price Effects Of Horizontal Mergers: A Theoretical Interpretation,"
Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 236-255, July.
- Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, "undated". "Horizontal Mergers in the Spokes Model," Discussion Papers 09/12, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, 2012. "On the Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers: A Theoretical Interpretation," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1201, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, 2012. "On the Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers : A Theoretical Interpretation," Working Papers 1222, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, 2012. "On the Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers : A Theoretical Interpretation," Working Papers halshs-00717467, HAL.
- Emilie Dargaud & Carlo Reggiani, 2013. "On the Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers : A Theoretical Interpretation," Post-Print halshs-00861685, HAL.
- Brito, Duarte, 2005. "Should alternative mergers or acquisitions be considered by antitrust authorities?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 129-153, February.
- Jacques Laye & Hervé Tanguy, 2004. "Are neighbors welcome ? e-buyer search, price competition and coalition strategy in the Internet retailing," Working Papers hal-00242928, HAL.
- Ralph M. Braid, 2014. "Search costs decrease prices in a model of spatial competition," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 93(1), pages 125-139, March.
- Zhiqi Chen & Gang Li, 2018.
"Horizontal Mergers In The Presence Of Capacity Constraints,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 56(2), pages 1346-1356, April.
- Zhiqi Chen & Gang Li, 2014. "Horizontal Mergers in the Presence of Capacity Constraints," Carleton Economic Papers 14-11, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007.
"Antitrust,"
Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225,
Elsevier.
- Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 12867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Competition Policy Center, Working Paper Series qt9pt7p9bm, Competition Policy Center, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Domenico Scalera & Alberto Zazzaro, 2005. "Cost reducing investments and spatial competition," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 12(20), pages 1-8.
- Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2014.
"Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficinecy defense?,"
Working Papers
14-12, NET Institute.
- Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2014. "Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Working Papers 14-12, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Nov 2014.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade, 2015. "Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Post-Print hal-01668480, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade, 2015. "Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Post-Print hal-01668471, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade, 2017. "Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Post-Print hal-01668579, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Thomas Cortade & Edmond Baranes, 2014. "Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Post-Print hal-01668455, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade, 2015. "Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Post-Print hal-01668573, HAL.
- Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2014. "Merger Control on Two-Sided Markets: Is There Need for an Efficiency Defense?," Working Papers hal-01830016, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade, 2015. "Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Post-Print hal-01668464, HAL.
- Andreea Cosnita-Langlais & Edmond Baranes & Thomas Cortade, 2016. "Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense?," Post-Print hal-01668515, HAL.
- Jacques Laye & Charis Lina & Herve Tanguy, 2006. "E-consumers' search and emerging structure of B-to-C coalitions," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 374, Society for Computational Economics.
- Emilie Dargaud, 2013.
"Horizontal mergers, efficiency gains and remedies,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 349-372, October.
- Emilie Dargaud, 2013. "Horizontal mergers, efficiency gains and remedies," Post-Print halshs-00799512, HAL.
- Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre, 2000.
"From local to global competition,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 423-448, March.
- Anderson, Simon P & de Palma, André, 1996. "From Local to Global Competition," CEPR Discussion Papers 1328, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- S. P. Anderson & A. de Palma, 1997. "From local to global competition," THEMA Working Papers 97-10, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Simon P. Anderson & Andre de Palma, 1998. "From Local to Global Competition," Virginia Economics Online Papers 344, University of Virginia, Department of Economics.
- Marie Goppelsroeder & Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra, 2008.
"Quantifying The Scope For Efficiency Defense In Merger Control: The Werden‐Froeb‐Index,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 778-808, December.
- Marie Goppelsroeder & Maarten Pieter Schinkel & Jan Tuinstra, 2006. "Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: The Werden-Froeb-Index," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 06-074/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Goppelsroeder, M. & Schinkel, M.P. & Tuinstra, J., 2006. "Quantifying the Scope for Efficiency Defense in Merger Control: The Werden-Froeb-Index," CeNDEF Working Papers 06-09, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
- Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
- Nicholas Economides & Jamie Howell & Sergio Meza, 2002. "Does it Pay to be First? Sequential Locational Choice and Foreclosure," Working Papers 02-19, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Gilbert E. Metcalf & George Norman, 2002.
"Oligopoly Deregulation in General Equilibrium: A Tax Neutralization Result,"
Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University
0210, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Gilbert E. Metcalf & George Norman, 2003. "Oligopoly Deregulation in General Equilibrium: A Tax Neutralization Result," NBER Working Papers 9416, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:71:y:2001:i:3:p:421-427. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.