The probability of a Condorcet winner with a small number of voters
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- Gehrlein, William V, 1990. "Probability Calculations for Transitivity of Simple Majority Rule with Anonymous Voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 253-259, September.
- William Gehrlein & Peter Fishburn, 1976. "Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, June.
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- Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
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