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Non-linear pricing with a general cost function

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  • Monteiro, Paulo Klinger
  • Page, Frank Jr.

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  • Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page, Frank Jr., 1996. "Non-linear pricing with a general cost function," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 287-291, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:52:y:1996:i:3:p:287-291
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 265-281, April.
    2. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ke-Wei Huang & Arun Sundararajan, 2011. "Pricing Digital Goods: Discontinuous Costs and Shared Infrastructure," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 22(4), pages 721-738, December.
    2. Thomas, Lionel, 2001. "Cost functions in non-linear pricing," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 53-59, July.

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