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Equivalence between the Diamond-Dybvig banking model and the optimal income taxation model

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  • Lin, Ping

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  • Lin, Ping, 2003. "Equivalence between the Diamond-Dybvig banking model and the optimal income taxation model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 193-198, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:79:y:2003:i:2:p:193-198
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eric Maskin & John Riley, 1984. "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 171-196, Summer.
    2. Ping Lin, 1996. "Banking, incentive constraints, and demand deposit contracts with nonlinear returns (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 27-39.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    4. Jacklin, Charles J & Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1988. "Distinguishing Panics and Information-Based Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 568-592, June.
    5. Efraim Sadka, 1976. "On Income Distribution, Incentive Effects and Optimal Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(2), pages 261-267.
    6. Neil Wallace, 1990. "A banking model in which partial suspension is best," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 14(Fall), pages 11-23.
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