An optional permit system for global pollution control
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- García, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2018.
"Time-inconsistent environmental policies with a consumer-friendly firm: Tradable permits versus emission tax,"
International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 523-537.
- Garcia, Arturo & Leal, Mariel & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2018. "Time-inconsistent environmental policies with a consumer-friendly firm: tradable permits versus emission tax," MPRA Paper 86407, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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