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Risk aversion, imperfect competition, and long-lived information

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  • Holden, Craig W.
  • Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar

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  • Holden, Craig W. & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1994. "Risk aversion, imperfect competition, and long-lived information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 181-190.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:44:y:1994:i:1-2:p:181-190
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Holden, Craig W & Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar, 1992. "Long-Lived Private Information and Imperfect Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 247-270, March.
    2. Kyle, Albert S, 1985. "Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1315-1335, November.
    3. Foster, F Douglas & Viswanathan, S, 1993. "The Effect of Public Information and Competition on Trading Volume and Price Volatility," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(1), pages 23-56.
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