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Asymmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

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  • Harstad, Ronald M.

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  • Harstad, Ronald M., 1991. "Asymmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 249-252, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:249-252
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    Cited by:

    1. Jorg Borrmann & Michaela Schaffhauser-Linzatti, 2008. "Franchise bidding with differences in demand," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(11), pages 849-852.
    2. Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0518, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
    3. Hernando-Veciana, Angel, 2004. "Successful uninformed bidding," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 29-53, July.
    4. Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 042008, Católica Porto Business School, Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
    5. Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad, 2007. "Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 399-410, August.
    6. Murto, Pauli & Välimäki, Juuso, 2015. "Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 60-74.
    7. Fernando Branco, 1996. "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 283-309, December.
    8. Ronald M. Harstad & Michael H. Rothkopf, 2000. "An "Alternating Recognition" Model of English Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(1), pages 1-12, January.
    9. Gonçalves, Ricardo, 2008. "Irrationality in English auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 180-192, July.
    10. Ronald M. Harstad, 2010. "Auctioning the Right to Choose When Competition Persists," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 78-85, March.
    11. Shahriar, Quazi & Wooders, John, 2011. "An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 558-573, June.
    12. Charness, Gary & Levin, Dan & Schmeidler, David, 2019. "An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 73-98.
    13. Ronald M Harstad, 2011. "Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0816, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    14. Habib, Michel A. & Ziegler, Alexandre, 2007. "Why government bonds are sold by auction and corporate bonds by posted-price selling," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 343-367, July.
    15. Panos L. Lorentziadis, 2020. "Value-Rationalizability in Auction Bidding," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 1-13, June.
    16. Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M., 2003. "Private information revelation in common-value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 264-282, April.
    17. Agranov, Marina & Yariv, Leeat, 2018. "Collusion through communication in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-108.
    18. Christopher Avery & John H. Kagel, 1997. "Second‐Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(3), pages 573-603, September.
    19. Michel A. Habib & Alexandre Ziegler, 2003. "Why Government Bonds Are Sold by Auction and Corporate Bonds by Posted-Price Selling," FAME Research Paper Series rp78, International Center for Financial Asset Management and Engineering.

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