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Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods: A comment

Author

Listed:
  • Sandholtz, Will
  • Tai, Andrew

Abstract

We note that the proofs of Bird (1984), the first to show group strategy-proofness of top trading cycles (TTC), require correction. We provide a counterexample to a critical claim and present corrected proofs in the spirit of the originals. We also present a novel proof of strong group strategy-proofness using the corrected results.

Suggested Citation

  • Sandholtz, Will & Tai, Andrew, 2024. "Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods: A comment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 243(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:243:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524004221
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111938
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bettina Klaus & Flip Klijn & Jay Sethuraman, 2024. "A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement," Working Papers 1468, Barcelona School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Top trading cycles; Group strategy-proofness; Group incentive compatibility; House swapping;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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