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Strategically simple implementation in the bilateral trade problem

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  • Yang, Chih-Chun

Abstract

In the bilateral trade problem, we investigate strategically simple mechanisms (Börgers and Li, 2019) where there may be strategies that are weakly dominated for all utility types. We show that neither local dictatorship, nor ex post individual rationality is satisfied in every strategically simple mechanism.

Suggested Citation

  • Yang, Chih-Chun, 2023. "Strategically simple implementation in the bilateral trade problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 233(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:233:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523004408
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111414
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tilman Börgers & Jiangtao Li, 2019. "Strategically Simple Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2003-2035, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mukherjee, Saptarshi & Muto, Nozomu & Sen, Arunava, 2024. "Implementation in undominated strategies with applications to auction design, public good provision and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 216(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Implementation; Strategically simple; Weak dominance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design

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