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Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited

Author

Listed:
  • Katsoulacos, Yannis
  • Ulph, David

Abstract

Katsoulacos and Ulph (2009) showed how all the factors identified as being relevant to choosing between a Per Se and an Effects-Based legal standard in terms of their decision error costs could be combined into a simple formula for determining which standard to use. Seifert (2020) gives an alternative characterisation of an Effects-Based legal standard and shows that its decision error costs are never higher than those of Per Se We argue that nevertheless our original formula remains valid for choosing between these two legal standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Katsoulacos, Yannis & Ulph, David, 2020. "Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:196:y:2020:i:c:s0165176520303499
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109578
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Seifert, Jacob, 2020. "Optimal legal standards for competition policy revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    2. Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, 2009. "On Optimal Legal Standards For Competition Policy: A General Welfare‐Based Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 410-437, September.
    3. William E. Kovacic & Carl Shapiro, 2000. "Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 43-60, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yannis Katsoulacos & David Ulph, 2023. "Choosing legal rules or standards in antitrust enforcement: A proposal for extending and facilitating the use of the decision‐theoretic approach," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(4), pages 1876-1894, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legal standards; Per Se; Effects-based; Decision errors; Bayesian updating;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law

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