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A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities

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  • Kong, Qianqian
  • Sun, Hao
  • Xu, Genjiu
  • Sun, Panfei

Abstract

This paper formulates the concept of Betrand oligopoly partition games. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that such well-defined games have positive externalities. More importantly, the core is proved to approximate the Equal Division solution in infinite markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Kong, Qianqian & Sun, Hao & Xu, Genjiu & Sun, Panfei, 2019. "A limit theorem for the core of Betrand oligopoly games with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:185:y:2019:i:c:s0165176519303751
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108747
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 153-175, Springer.
    2. Sergio Currarini & Marco A. Marini, 2015. "Coalitional Approaches to Collusive Agreements in Oligopoly Games," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(3), pages 253-287, June.
    3. R. M. Thrall & W. F. Lucas, 1963. "N‐person games in partition function form," Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 10(1), pages 281-298, March.
    4. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    5. Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon & T. S. H. Driessen, 2017. "Stackelberg Oligopoly TU-Games: Characterization and Nonemptiness of the Core," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 19(04), pages 1-16, December.
    6. Aymeric Lardon, 2012. "The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 72(3), pages 387-411, March.
    7. Hafalir, Isa E., 2007. "Efficiency in coalition games with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 242-258, November.
    8. Paraskevas V. Lekeas, 2013. "Coalitional Beliefs In Cournot Oligopoly Tu Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 15(01), pages 1-21.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

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    2. Zhou, Wuhao & Xu, Yuanlu & Zhang, Li & Lin, Huifang, 2023. "Does public behavior and research development matters for economic growth in SMEs: Evidence from Chinese listed firms," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 107-119.
    3. Hasan, Mohammad Maruf & Du, Fang, 2023. "Nexus between green financial development, green technological innovation and environmental regulation in China," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 218-228.
    4. Li, ChangZheng & Umair, Muhammad, 2023. "Does green finance development goals affects renewable energy in China," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 898-905.
    5. Xu, Jialong & Moslehpour, Massoud & Tran, Trung Kien & Dinh, Khai Cong & Ngo, Thanh Quang & Huy, Pham Quang, 2023. "The role of institutional quality, renewable energy development and trade openness in green finance: Empirical evidence from South Asian countries," Renewable Energy, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 687-692.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Betrand oligopoly; Externalities; Core; Limit; Equal Division solution;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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