Which equilibrium yields the highest expected revenue in second-price sealed-bid auctions?
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.016
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- Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
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Keywords
Second-price sealed-bid auction;JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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