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Relative social status and conformism: Experimental evidence on local public good contributions

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  • d’Adda, Giovanna

Abstract

Through an artefactual field experiment conducted in Colombia, where participants make repeated contributions to a local natural conservation project, I test a novel way to identify high status individuals within a community, and show that status, so defined, is correlated with public good giving. Both absolute and relative status have a statistically significant and economically relevant influence on behavior. In particular, the same individual, when matched with a lower status partner, donates more and conforms less to the partner’s action. The results indicate that contributions to local public goods can be enhanced by interventions that make relative status more salient.

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  • d’Adda, Giovanna, 2017. "Relative social status and conformism: Experimental evidence on local public good contributions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 31-35.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:157:y:2017:i:c:p:31-35
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Suchon, Rémi & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "The effects of status mobility and group identity on trust," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 430-463.
    2. Feldhaus, Christoph & Gleue, Marvin & Löschel, Andreas, 2022. "Can a Catholic institution promote sustainable behavior? Field experimental evidence on donations for climate protection," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public good; Social status; Artefactual field experiment; Social information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products

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