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Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security

Author

Listed:
  • Fu, Hu
  • Kleinberg, Robert
  • Lavi, Ron
  • Smorodinsky, Rann

Abstract

Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.

Suggested Citation

  • Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert & Lavi, Ron & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017. "Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 154(C), pages 55-58.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:154:y:2017:i:c:p:55-58
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.02.024
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fu, Hu & Kleinberg, Robert & Lavi, Ron & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2017. "Job security, stability and production efficiency," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    2. Gul, Faruk & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1999. "Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 95-124, July.
    3. Lehmann, Benny & Lehmann, Daniel & Nisan, Noam, 2006. "Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 270-296, May.
    4. Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1999. "Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 193-220, January.
    5. Kelso, Alexander S, Jr & Crawford, Vincent P, 1982. "Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1483-1504, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lavi, Ron & Shamash, Elisheva S., 2022. "Principal-agent VCG contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stable matching; Simultaneous single-item auctions;

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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