IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v150y2017icp4-5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Rowell, David
  • Nghiem, Son Hong
  • Connelly, Luke B.

Abstract

The disentanglement of adverse selection from ex ante moral hazard remains an empirical challenge. Our comment dissects a natural experiment proposed by Chiappori and Salanié (2000) to test for ex ante moral hazard. Firstly, we argue that their test, as proposed, is too simple and too general to enable reliable inferences about the existence of ex ante moral hazard to be drawn and the reported negative coefficient does not rule out moral hazard. Secondly, their analysis strongly suggests that their proposed instrument (inherited bonus malus) is endogenously determined and therefore does not satisfy the technical requirements of a natural experiment.

Suggested Citation

  • Rowell, David & Nghiem, Son Hong & Connelly, Luke B., 2017. "Testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets: A test for ex ante moral hazard revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 4-5.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:4-5
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.044
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176516304529
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.10.044?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georges Dionne (ed.), 2013. "Handbook of Insurance," Springer Books, Springer, edition 2, number 978-1-4614-0155-1, June.
    2. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Nathaniel Hendren & Camille Landais & Johannes Spinnewijn, 2021. "Choice in Insurance Markets: A Pigouvian Approach to Social Insurance Design," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 13(1), pages 457-486, August.
    2. Pierre Picard & Kili C Wang, 2016. "Collusion in Vertical Relationships: The Case of Insurance Fraud in Taiwan," Working Papers hal-01385502, HAL.
    3. Johannes Spinnewijn, 2017. "Heterogeneity, Demand for Insurance, and Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 308-343, February.
    4. Sebastian Soika, 2018. "Moral Hazard and Advantageous Selection in Private Disability Insurance," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 43(1), pages 97-125, January.
    5. Helmi Jedidi & Georges Dionne, 2024. "Nonparametric Testing for Information Asymmetry in the Mortgage Servicing Market," Risks, MDPI, vol. 12(12), pages 1-40, November.
    6. Bernard Salanié, 2017. "Equilibrium in Insurance Markets: An Empiricist’s View," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 42(1), pages 1-14, March.
    7. Fabio G Santeramo, 2019. "I Learn, You Learn, We Gain Experience in Crop Insurance Markets," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(2), pages 284-304, June.
    8. Hao Zheng & Yi Yao & Yinglu Deng & Feng Gao, 2022. "Information asymmetry, ex ante moral hazard, and uninsurable risk in liability coverage: Evidence from China's automobile insurance market," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 89(1), pages 131-160, March.
    9. Dionne, Georges & Harrington, Scott, 2017. "Insurance and Insurance Markets," Working Papers 17-2, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
    10. Georges Dionne & Ying Liu, 2021. "Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(2), pages 453-477, April.
    11. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2021. "Adverse selection, efficiency and the structure of information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 579-614, September.
    12. Jan Michael Bauer & Jörg Schiller & Christopher Schreckenberger, 2020. "Heterogeneous selection in the market for private supplemental dental insurance: evidence from Germany," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 205-231, July.
    13. Park, Kevin A., 2016. "FHA loan performance and adverse selection in mortgage insurance," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 82-97.
    14. Daniel Bauer & Jochen Russ & Nan Zhu, 2020. "Asymmetric information in secondary insurance markets: Evidence from the life settlements market," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1143-1175, July.
    15. Randy E. Dumm & Charles Nyce & G. Stacy Sirmans & Greg T. Smersh, 2022. "Pricing Moral Hazard in Residential Properties: The Impact of Sinkhole Claims on House Prices," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 30-70, January.
    16. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.
    17. Jean-François Outreville, 2014. "The Meaning of Risk? Insights from The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 39(4), pages 768-781, October.
    18. Levon Barseghyan & Francesca Molinari & Darcy Steeg Morris & Joshua C. Teitelbaum, 2020. "The Cost of Legal Restrictions on Experience Rating," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 17(1), pages 38-70, March.
    19. Corina Birghila & Tim J. Boonen & Mario Ghossoub, 2020. "Optimal Insurance under Maxmin Expected Utility," Papers 2010.07383, arXiv.org.
    20. Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019. "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 44(1), pages 87-135, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Moral hazard; Natural experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C1 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:150:y:2017:i:c:p:4-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.