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A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information

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  • Liu, Zhiyang
  • Chen, Bo

Abstract

We construct both monotonic and non-monotonic symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for a two-player all-pay contest with binary types and correlated information structures. We also employ a class of parametric distributions to illustrate our equilibrium construction explicitly and to derive some comparative statics results.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Zhiyang & Chen, Bo, 2016. "A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 6-10.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:145:y:2016:i:c:p:6-10
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    2. Siegel, Ron, 2014. "Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 684-702.
    3. Kai A. Konrad, 2004. "Altruism and envy in contests: An evolutionarily stable symbiosis," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(3), pages 479-490, June.
    4. Amann, Erwin & Leininger, Wolfgang, 1996. "Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 1-18, May.
    5. Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 1997. "An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 343-362, February.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2022. "Media access, bias and public opinion," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    2. Chi, Chang Koo & Murto, Pauli & Valimaki, Juuso, 2017. "All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Values," MPRA Paper 80799, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Andrzej Baranski & Sumit Goel, 2024. "Contest design with a finite type-space: A unifying approach," Papers 2410.04970, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2024.
    4. Chen, Zhuoqiong, 2021. "Optimal information exchange in contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C).
    5. Zhuoqiong Chen, 2021. "All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents’ values," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 33-64, June.
    6. Anastasia Antsygina & Mariya Teteryatnikova, 2023. "Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 75(3), pages 743-780, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    All-pay auction; Correlated types; Symmetric equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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