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Shareholder information and partial tender offers

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  • Dalkır, Elif

Abstract

The raider faces a winners’ curse problem, when the target shareholders have private information about the post takeover value. Using Marquez and Yılmaz (2008) framework, we show that this problem can be partly mitigated by using partial tender offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Dalkır, Elif, 2015. "Shareholder information and partial tender offers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 64-66.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:136:y:2015:i:c:p:64-66
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.08.033
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georges Dionne & Mélissa La Haye & Anne‐Sophie Bergerès, 2015. "Does asymmetric information affect the premium in mergers and acquisitions?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(3), pages 819-852, August.
    2. Francesca Cornelli & David D. Li, 2002. "Risk Arbitrage in Takeovers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(3), pages 837-868.
    3. Robert Marquez & Bilge Yılmaz, 2008. "Information and Efficiency in Tender Offers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(5), pages 1075-1101, September.
    4. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring.
    5. Mehmet Ekmekci & Nenad Kos, 2014. "Value of Information and Fairness Opinions in Takeovers," Working Papers 510, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
    6. Mark Bagnoli, Barton L. Lipman, 1988. "Successful Takeovers without Exclusion," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 89-110.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partial tender offers; Winners’ curse; Asymmetric information;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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