Group inefficiency in a common property resource game with asymmetric players
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.002
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More about this item
Keywords
Asymmetric players; Heterogeneous discounting; Group inefficiency; Differential games; Resource games;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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