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Direct evidence of risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in health insurance

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  • Schmitz, Hendrik

Abstract

Using the self-stated degree of risk aversion regarding health from the GSOEP we find some evidence for risk aversion being a source of advantageous selection. Risk averse men more often procure supplementary insurance for hospital visits despite needing the additional coverage less.

Suggested Citation

  • Schmitz, Hendrik, 2011. "Direct evidence of risk aversion as a source of advantageous selection in health insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(2), pages 180-182.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:113:y:2011:i:2:p:180-182
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.06.016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. David M. Cutler & Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2008. "Preference Heterogeneity and Insurance Markets: Explaining a Puzzle of Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 157-162, May.
    2. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 2001. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 249-262, Summer.
    3. Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde & Jürgen Schupp & Gert G. Wagner, 2011. "Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants, And Behavioral Consequences," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 522-550, June.
    4. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    5. David A. Jaeger & Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk & David Huffman & Uwe Sunde & Holger Bonin, 2010. "Direct Evidence on Risk Attitudes and Migration," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 92(3), pages 684-689, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Schurer, Stefanie, 2017. "Bouncing back from health shocks: Locus of control and labor supply," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 1-20.
    2. Marcela V. Parada‐Contzen, 2019. "The Value of a Statistical Life for Risk‐Averse and Risk‐Seeking Individuals," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(11), pages 2369-2390, November.
    3. Pilny, Adam & Wübker, Ansgar & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2017. "Introducing risk adjustment and free health plan choice in employer-based health insurance: Evidence from Germany," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 330-351.
    4. Yawen Jiang & Weiyi Ni, 2019. "Risk selection into supplemental private health insurance in China," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 1-11, December.
    5. Daniele Fabbri & Chiara Monfardini, 2016. "Opt Out or Top Up? Voluntary Health Care Insurance and the Public vs. Private Substitution," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 78(1), pages 75-93, February.
    6. Bonsang, Eric & Costa-Font, Joan, 2022. "Buying control? ‘Locus of control’ and the uptake of supplementary health insurance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 204(C), pages 476-489.
    7. Jan Michael Bauer & Jörg Schiller & Christopher Schreckenberger, 2020. "Heterogeneous selection in the market for private supplemental dental insurance: evidence from Germany," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 205-231, July.
    8. Decker, Simon & Schmitz, Hendrik, 2016. "Health shocks and risk aversion," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 156-170.
    9. Renate Lange & Jörg Schiller & Petra Steinorth, 2015. "Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 757, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
    10. Renate Lange & Jörg Schiller & Petra Steinorth, 2017. "Demand and Selection Effects in Supplemental Health Insurance in Germany," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 42(1), pages 5-30, January.
    11. Sebastian Panthöfer, 2016. "Risk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt‐Out," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(9), pages 1163-1181, September.
    12. McInnis, Nicardo, 2023. "Long-term health effects of childhood parental income," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 317(C).
    13. Elena Lagomarsino & Alessandro Spiganti, 2023. "Risk Aversion and the Size of Desired Debt," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 9(1), pages 369-396, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Risk aversion; Health insurance; Advantageous selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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