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Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand

Author

Listed:
  • Busch, Lutz-Alexander
  • Curry, Philip A.

Abstract

If willingness to pay depends on characteristics of other attendees, a monopolist will use a lineup as a screening mechanism only if a consumer's characteristic is inversely related to her cost of lining up. No capacity constraint is necessary.

Suggested Citation

  • Busch, Lutz-Alexander & Curry, Philip A., 2011. "Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 40-42, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:1:p:40-42
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Becker, Gary S, 1991. "A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on Price," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1109-1116, October.
    2. DeSerpa, Allan C & Faith, Roger L, 1996. ""Bru-u-u-uce": The Simple Economics of Mob Goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(1-2), pages 77-91, October.
    3. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, 1996. "Damaged Goods," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(2), pages 149-174, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sander, Christian J. & Thiem, Stefan, 2023. "Should football fans pay for security? Effects of a security fee," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 122-130.

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