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Managing local commons in developing economies: an institutional approach

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  • Randhir, Timothy O.
  • Lee, John G.

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  • Randhir, Timothy O. & Lee, John G., 1996. "Managing local commons in developing economies: an institutional approach," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-12, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:16:y:1996:i:1:p:1-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
    2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    3. Daniel W. Bromley & Devendra P. Chapagain, 1984. "The Village Against the Center: Resource Depletion in South Asia," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 66(5), pages 868-873.
    4. Larson, Bruce A. & Bromley, Daniel W., 1990. "Property rights, externalities, and resource degradation : Locating the tragedy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 235-262, October.
    5. Terry L. Anderson, 1982. "The New Resource Economics: Old Ideas and New Applications," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(5), pages 928-934, December.
    6. Bromley, D.W. & Cernea, M.M., 1989. "The Management Of Common Property Natural Resources - Some Conceptual And Operational Fallacies," World Bank - Discussion Papers 57, World Bank.
    7. Anderson, Terry L., 1982. "The New Resource Economics: Old Ideas And New Applications," 1982 Annual Meeting, August 1-4, Logan, Utah 279161, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Terry L. Anderson, 1982. "The New Resource Economics: Old Ideas and New Applications," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 64(5), pages 928-934.
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    Cited by:

    1. Bartolini, Stefano & Bonatti, Luigi, 2002. "Environmental and social degradation as the engine of economic growth," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 1-16, November.
    2. Takesi Murota & Irina Glazyrina, 2010. "Common-pool resources in East Russia: a case study on the creation of a new national park as a form of community-based natural resource governance," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 11(1), pages 37-52, February.
    3. Paavola, Jouni & Adger, W. Neil, 2005. "Institutional ecological economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-368, May.
    4. Achim Lerch, 1998. "Property Rights and Biodiversity," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 285-304, November.

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