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Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem

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  • Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran
  • Sarkar, Sudipto

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of managerial compensation terms on the well-known "underinvestment" incentive. We extend the Mauer and Ott (2000) real-option model of corporate expansion, and show that, when the manager maximizes the value of his compensation package (rather than equity value), the underinvestment problem can be substantially mitigated. Further, by designing an appropriate compensation contract, it is possible to eliminate the underinvestment incentive altogether. This managerial contract, consisting of fixed salary and equity ownership, is explicitly derived in the model. The equity ownership level is found to be an increasing function of the manager's fixed salary and the company's earnings growth rate, and a decreasing function of leverage ratio, earnings volatility, tax rate, bankruptcy costs, and the manager's severance pay at bankruptcy.

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  • Kanagaretnam, Kiridaran & Sarkar, Sudipto, 2011. "Managerial compensation and the underinvestment problem," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(1-2), pages 308-315, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:28:y:2011:i:1-2:p:308-315
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    11. Omar Farooque & Wonlop Buachoom & Nam Hoang, 2019. "Interactive effects of executive compensation, firm performance and corporate governance: Evidence from an Asian market," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 36(4), pages 1111-1164, December.
    12. Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2020. "Investments under vertical relations and agency conflicts: A real options approach," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 273-287.
    13. Carlo Cambini & Sara De Masi & Laura Rondi, 2016. "CEO incentives in European energy utilities: evidence from regulated versus unregulated firms," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 43(2), pages 127-155, June.
    14. Shang, Xiaodan & Luo, Chuanjian & Wen, Qian, 2020. "Do Chinese executives reward for luck?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 318-325.
    15. Ana CARP, 2017. "Wage correlation with consumer price index – Compensation and indexing," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 65(11), pages 54-64, November.
    16. Pareja-Alcaraz, Pablo, 2017. "Chinese investments in Southern Europe's energy sectors: Similarities and divergences in China's strategies in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 700-710.
    17. J. Samuel Baixauli-Soler & Maria Belda-Ruiz & Gregorio Sanchez-Marin, 2017. "An executive hierarchy analysis of stock options: Does gender matter?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 11(4), pages 737-766, October.
    18. Dylan Minor, 2016. "Executive Compensation and Environmental Harm," Harvard Business School Working Papers 16-076, Harvard Business School, revised Apr 2016.
    19. Huang, Hsing-Hua & Huang, Hongming & Shih, Pai-Ta, 2012. "Real options and earnings-based bonus compensation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2389-2402.
    20. Ann-Christine Schulz & Miriam Flickinger, 2020. "Does CEO (over)compensation influence corporate reputation?," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 903-927, August.
    21. Viput Ongsakul & Anutchanat Jaroenjitrkam & Sirimon Treepongkaruna & Pornsit Jiraporn, 2022. "Does board gender diversity reduce ‘CEO luck’?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 62(1), pages 243-260, March.
    22. Albring, Susan M. & Khurana, Inder K. & Nejadmalayeri, Ali & Pereira, Raynolde, 2011. "Managerial compensation and the debt placement decision," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(5), pages 1445-1456.
    23. Kim, Hwa-Sung, 2013. "Executive bonus compensation when abnormal earnings and the state of the economy are correlated," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 58-65.
    24. Baixauli-Soler, J. Samuel & Belda-Ruiz, Maria & Sanchez-Marin, Gregorio, 2015. "Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 451-463.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Real-option Underinvestment Management compensation Agency problem;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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