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Violence and property rights

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  • Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter

Abstract

Since the middle ages, when Europe was still at a Malthusian stage of development, interpersonal violence has been in steady decline, and institutions and norms limiting violence – in particular property rights – have expanded. Here we put forward a Malthusian model of violence where these trends can be interpreted as a response to easing population pressure, following an acceleration in technological progress. The idea is that agents rationally risk dying in violent resource competition in order to make more of their children survive starvation. Violence carries a positive externality, because those who die free up resources for survivors. This generates a socially optimal level of violence, which can be implemented with the right amount of property rights protection. It is shown that faster technological progress can lead to a decline in violence and improved property rights protection, similar to the path followed by Europe.

Suggested Citation

  • Lagerlöf, Nils-Petter, 2013. "Violence and property rights," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 312-328.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:37:y:2013:i:1:p:312-328
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2012.08.006
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Violence; Growth model; Malthusian; Property rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative
    • N50 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - General, International, or Comparative

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