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Optimal monetary policy when lump-sum taxes are unavailable: A reconsideration of the outcomes under commitment and discretion

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  • Ellison, Martin
  • Rankin, Neil

Abstract

We re-examine optimal monetary policy when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. Under commitment, we show that, with alternative utility functions to that considered in Nicolini’s related analysis, the direction of the incentive to cheat may depend on the initial level of government debt, with low debt creating an incentive towards surprise deflation, but high debt the reverse. Under discretion, we show that the economy will not necessarily tend to the Friedman Rule, as Obstfeld found. Instead it may tend to the critical debt level at which there is no cheating incentive under commitment, and inflation and could well be positive here.
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  • Ellison, Martin & Rankin, Neil, 2007. "Optimal monetary policy when lump-sum taxes are unavailable: A reconsideration of the outcomes under commitment and discretion," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 219-243, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:31:y:2007:i:1:p:219-243
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    1. Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," NBER Working Papers 2869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Javier Diaz-Gimenez & Giorgia Giovannetti & Ramon Marimon & Pedro Teles, 2008. "Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 493-514, July.
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    12. Neiss, Katharine S, 1999. "Discretionary Inflation in a General Equilibrium Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 357-374, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler, 2017. "Collateral, Liquidity and Debt Sustainability," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(604), pages 2093-2126, September.
    2. Ricardo Nunes & Davide Debortoli, 2007. "Political Disagreement, Lack of Commitment and the Level of Debt," 2007 Meeting Papers 725, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2013. "Fiscal Sustainability in a New Keynesian Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 45(8), pages 1477-1516, December.
    4. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler & Gerhard Sorger, 2013. "Central Bank Independence And The Monetary Instrument Problem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54(3), pages 1031-1055, August.
    5. Stefano Gnocchi & Luisa Lambertini, 2016. "Monetary Commitment and the Level of Public Debt," Staff Working Papers 16-3, Bank of Canada.
    6. Leith, Campbell & Wren-Lewis, Simon, 2011. "Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 93-117, January.
    7. Brendon, Charles & Ellison, Martin, 2018. "Time-consistently undominated policies," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87176, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    8. Jean-Charles Bricongne & Leonor Coutinho & Alessandro Turrini & Stefan Zeugner, 2020. "Is Private Debt Excessive?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 471-512, April.
    9. Arbex, Marcelo & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2011. "Optimal monetary and audit policy with imperfect taxation," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 327-340, June.
    10. Wang, Gaowang & Zou, Heng-fu, 2011. "Inflation aversion and macroeconomic policy in a perfect foresight monetary model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1802-1807, July.
    11. Arbex, Marcelo & Villamil, Anne P., 2009. "On the Optimality of the Friedman Rule with Costly Tax Enforcement," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 7-30.
    12. Gaowang Wang & Heng-fu Zou, 2010. "A New Approach to Inflation Aversion," CEMA Working Papers 471, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    13. Javier Diaz-Gimenez & Giorgia Giovannetti & Ramon Marimon & Pedro Teles, 2008. "Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 493-514, July.
    14. Yanagihara, Mitsuyoshi & Lu, Chen, 2013. "Cash-in-advance constraint, optimal monetary policy, and human capital accumulation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 278-288.
    15. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-lewis, 2006. "The Costs of Fiscal Inflexibility," WEF Working Papers 0005, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    16. Martin Ellison & Charles Brendon, 2015. "Time-Consistent Institutional Design," 2015 Meeting Papers 495, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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