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Demand for insurance and within-kin-group marriages: Evidence from a West-African country

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  • Hotte, Rozenn
  • Marazyan, Karine

Abstract

We ask whether parents have incentives to marry their children to a member of the kin group in order to better insure against adverse idiosyncratic income shocks. Exploiting original panel data from a household survey collected in Senegal in 2006/2007 and 2011/2012, we find that daughters' within-kin-group marriage helps their parents' household to better smooth food consumption when a parent has fallen ill. This better smoothing is notably driven by the fact that households having married a daughter within the kin group receive relatively more transfers. Our results indicate that parents’ demand for insurance can explain part of their demand for marrying within the kin group their daughter and extend the literature on inter-linkages between marriage decisions and demand for insurance.

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  • Hotte, Rozenn & Marazyan, Karine, 2020. "Demand for insurance and within-kin-group marriages: Evidence from a West-African country," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:146:y:2020:i:c:s030438782030064x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2020.102489
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    Cited by:

    1. Isabelle Chort & Rozenn Hotte & Karine Marazyan, 2021. "Income shocks, bride price and child marriage in Turkey," Working papers of Transitions Energétiques et Environnementales (TREE) hal-03258215, HAL.
    2. Luis Guillermo Becerra-Valbuena & Katrin Millock, 2021. "Gendered migration responses to drought in Malawi," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03325853, HAL.
    3. Siwan Anderson & Chris Bidner, 2021. "An Institutional Perspective on the Economics of the Family," Discussion Papers dp21-14, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
    4. Luis G. BECERRA - VALBUENA & Katrin MILLOCK, 2021. "Gendered migration responses to drought in Malawi," JODE - Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 437-477, September.
    5. Luis Guillermo Becerra-Valbuena & Katrin Millock, 2021. "Gendered migration responses to drought in Malawi," Post-Print halshs-03325853, HAL.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Marriages; Kinship; Risk-coping; Sub-Saharan Africa;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • I32 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Measurement and Analysis of Poverty

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