IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v80y2023ics0929119923000585.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

What went wrong? The Puerto Rican debt crisis, the “Treasury Put,” and the failure of market discipline

Author

Listed:
  • Chirinko, Robert

Abstract

What went wrong? Why did seemingly rational, forward-looking bond investors continue to purchase Puerto Rican debt with only a modest risk premium? Why did financial markets fail to exercise market discipline and restrict capital flows to Puerto Rico?

Suggested Citation

  • Chirinko, Robert, 2023. "What went wrong? The Puerto Rican debt crisis, the “Treasury Put,” and the failure of market discipline," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:80:y:2023:i:c:s0929119923000585
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102409
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119923000585
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2023.102409?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gideon Bornstein & Guido Lorenzoni, 2018. "Moral Hazard Misconceptions: The Case of the Greenspan Put," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 66(2), pages 251-286, June.
    2. William N. Goetzmann, 2016. "Money Changes Everything: How Finance Made Civilization Possible," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10662.
    3. Andrew G. Atkeson & Adrien d’Avernas & Andrea L. Eisfeldt & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2019. "Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 81-145.
    4. Deborah Lucas, 2010. "Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number luca07-1.
    5. Fatas, Antonio & Mihov, Ilian, 2006. "The macroeconomic effects of fiscal rules in the US states," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1-2), pages 101-117, January.
    6. France, Virginia G. & Kahn, Charles M., 2016. "Law as a constraint on bailouts: Emergency support for central counterparties," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 22-31.
    7. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Luis Garicano & Philip R. Lane & Marco Pagano & Ricardo Reis & Tano Santos & David Thesmar & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh & Dimitri Vayanos, 2016. "The Sovereign-Bank Diabolic Loop and ESBies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(5), pages 508-512, May.
    8. Metcalf, Gilbert E., 1993. "Federal taxation and the supply of state debt," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 269-285, July.
    9. Kenneth E. Scott, 2010. "Appendix - Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them," Book Chapters, in: Kenneth E. Scott & George P. Shultz & John B. Taylor (ed.), Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them, chapter 15, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    10. Chirinko, Robert S. & Wilson, Daniel J., 2017. "Tax competition among U.S. states: Racing to the bottom or riding on a seesaw?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 147-163.
    11. James D. Hamilton, 1985. "Historical Causes of Postwar Oil Shocks and Recessions," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 1), pages 97-116.
    12. Heinemann, Friedrich & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2018. "Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 69-92.
    13. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1989. "Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1989, Volume 4, pages 121-184, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Nora Lustig, "undated". "The Mexican Peso Crisis: The Foreseeable and the Surprise," Discussion Papers 114, Brookings Institution International Economics.
    15. Katharina Herold, 2018. "Insolvency Frameworks for Sub-national Governments," OECD Working Papers on Fiscal Federalism 23, OECD Publishing.
    16. Gurkaynak, Refet S. & Sack, Brian & Wright, Jonathan H., 2007. "The U.S. Treasury yield curve: 1961 to the present," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2291-2304, November.
    17. Marcus Miller & Paul Weller & Lei Zhang, 2002. "Moral Hazard and the US Stock Market: Analysing the "Greenspan Put"," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(478), pages 171-186, March.
    18. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas & Philippe Martin & Todd E Messer, 2020. "The Economics of Sovereign Debt, Bailouts and the Eurozone Crisis," Working Papers hal-03813806, HAL.
    19. Deborah Lucas, 2010. "Introduction to "Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk"," NBER Chapters, in: Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Enrico Moretti & Daniel J. Wilson, 2017. "The Effect of State Taxes on the Geographical Location of Top Earners: Evidence from Star Scientists," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1858-1903, July.
    21. Anne-Laure Delatte & Julien Fouquau & Richard Portes, 2017. "Regime-Dependent Sovereign Risk Pricing During the Euro Crisis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 363-385.
    22. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
    23. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2017. "The Euro Trap: On Bursting Bubbles, Budgets, and Beliefs," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198791447.
    24. Arvind Krishnamurthy & Stefan Nagel & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2018. "ECB Policies Involving Government Bond Purchases: Impact and Channels [The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(1), pages 1-44.
    25. Zhiguo He & Konstantin Milbradt, 2014. "Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable Bonds," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(4), pages 1443-1508, July.
    26. Jensen, Michael C. & Fama, Eugene F. & Long, John Jr. & Ruback, Richard S. & Schwert, G. William & Smith, Clifford Jr. & Warner, Jerold, 1989. "Clinical papers and their role in the development of financial economics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 3-6, September.
    27. Ramey, Valerie A. & Shapiro, Matthew D., 1998. "Costly capital reallocation and the effects of government spending," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 145-194, June.
    28. Bryan Kelly & Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2016. "Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply about Sector-Wide Government Guarantees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(6), pages 1278-1319, June.
    29. Feld, Lars P. & Kalb, Alexander & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Osterloh, Steffen, 2017. "Sovereign bond market reactions to no-bailout clauses and fiscal rules – The Swiss experience," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 319-343.
    30. Julien Acalin, 2018. "Growth-indexed Bonds and Debt Distribution: Theoretical Benefits and Practical Limits," Working Paper Series WP18-7, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    31. Friewald, Nils & Jankowitsch, Rainer & Subrahmanyam, Marti G., 2012. "Illiquidity or credit deterioration: A study of liquidity in the US corporate bond market during financial crises," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(1), pages 18-36.
    32. English, William B, 1996. "Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default: American State Debts in the 1840's," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 259-275, March.
    33. Kirsten H. Heppke‐Falk & Guntram B. Wolff, 2008. "Moral Hazard and Bail‐Out in Fiscal Federations: Evidence for the German Länder," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 425-446, August.
    34. Feenberg, D.R. & Poterba, J.M., 1991. "Which Households Own Municipal Bonds? Evidence from Tax Returns," Working papers 588, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    35. James M. Poterba & Kim Rueben, 1999. "State Fiscal Institutions and the U.S. Municipal Bond Market," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 181-208, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    36. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    37. Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Feld, Lars P. & Kalb, Alexander & Osterloh, Steffen, 2013. "Sovereign Bond Market Reactions to Fiscal Rules and No-Bailout Clauses The Swiss Experience," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79807, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    38. Anne-Laure Delatte & Julien Fouquau & Richard Portes, 2017. "Regime-Dependent Sovereign Risk Pricing During the Euro Crisis," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 363-385.
    39. Capponi, Agostino & Corell, Felix & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 2022. "Optimal bailouts and the doom loop with a financial network," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 35-50.
    40. Schnabel, Isabel & Körner, Tobias, 2012. "Abolishing Public Guarantees in the Absence of Market Discipline," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 65401, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    41. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    42. Todd A. Gormley & Simon Johnson & Changyong Rhee, 2015. "Ending "Too Big To Fail": Government Promises Versus Investor Perceptions," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 19(2), pages 491-518.
    43. Francis A. Longstaff, 2011. "Municipal Debt and Marginal Tax Rates: Is There a Tax Premium in Asset Prices?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 66(3), pages 721-751, June.
    44. Hull, John & Predescu, Mirela & White, Alan, 2004. "The relationship between credit default swap spreads, bond yields, and credit rating announcements," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(11), pages 2789-2811, November.
    45. Dong, Yi & Hou, Qiannan & Ni, Chenkai, 2021. "Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    46. Bai, Jennie & Goldstein, Robert S. & Yang, Fan, 2019. "The leverage effect and the basket-index put spread," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 186-205.
    47. Thomas J. Sargent, 2012. "Nobel Lecture: United States Then, Europe Now," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(1), pages 1-40.
    48. Lucas, Deborah (ed.), 2010. "Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226496580, September.
    49. Eichenbaum, Martin & Parker, Jonathan A. (ed.), 2019. "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2018," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226645728, September.
    50. Olivier J. Blanchard & Paolo Mauro & Julien Acalin, 2016. "The Case for Growth-Indexed Bonds in Advanced Economies Today," Policy Briefs PB16-2, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    51. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1.
    52. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2016. "Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation: A Macroeconomic View," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2458-2493, September.
    53. O. Emre Ergungor, 2016. "Sovereign Default in the US," Working Papers (Old Series) 1609, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    54. Chalmers, John M R, 1998. "Default Risk Cannot Explain the Muni Puzzle: Evidence from Municipal Bonds That Are Secured by U.S. Treasury Obligations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 11(2), pages 281-308.
    55. Kenneth E. Scott & George P. Shultz & John B. Taylor, 2010. "Preface - Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them," Book Chapters, in: Kenneth E. Scott & George P. Shultz & John B. Taylor (ed.), Ending Government Bailouts As We Know Them, chapter 0, Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    56. Gerlinde Sinn & Hans-Werner Sinn, 1994. "Jumpstart: The Economic Unification of Germany," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262691728, April.
    57. Juan Passadore, 2015. "Illiquidity in Sovereign Debt Markets," 2015 Meeting Papers 191, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    58. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Introduction to "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance"," NBER Chapters, in: Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance, pages 1-12, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    59. Deborah Lucas, 2012. "Valuation of Government Policies and Projects," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 39-58, October.
    60. Deborah Lucas & Robert McDonald, 2010. "Valuing Government Guarantees: Fannie and Freddie Revisited," NBER Chapters, in: Measuring and Managing Federal Financial Risk, pages 131-154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    61. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 2017. "New Evidence on the Aftermath of Financial Crises in Advanced Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(10), pages 3072-3118, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrew G. Atkeson & Adrien d’Avernas & Andrea L. Eisfeldt & Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2019. "Government Guarantees and the Valuation of American Banks," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(1), pages 81-145.
    2. Stefan Nagel & Amiyatosh Purnanandam, 2020. "Banks’ Risk Dynamics and Distance to Default," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 33(6), pages 2421-2467.
    3. Samuel Antill & Asani Sarkar, 2018. "Is size everything?," Staff Reports 864, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Brändle, Thomas & Elsener, Marc, 2023. "Do fiscal rules matter? A survey on recent evidence," Working papers 2023/07, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
    5. Pedro Gete & Franco Zecchetto, 2018. "Distributional Implications of Government Guarantees in Mortgage Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(3), pages 1064-1097.
    6. Thomas Luke Spreen & Ed Gerrish, 2022. "Taxes and tax‐exempt bonds: A literature review," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(4), pages 767-808, September.
    7. Asatryan, Zareh & Castellón, César & Stratmann, Thomas, 2018. "Balanced budget rules and fiscal outcomes: Evidence from historical constitutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 105-119.
    8. Van Hecke, Annelore, 2013. "Vertical debt spillovers in EMU countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 468-492.
    9. Janeba, Eckhard & Steinbach, Armin, 2019. "Compliance effects of sovereign debt cuts," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    10. Wildmer Daniel Gregori & Luigi Marattin, 2019. "Determinants of fiscal distress in Italian municipalities," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 56(4), pages 1269-1281, April.
    11. Beck, Roland & Ferrucci, Gianluigi & Hantzsche, Arno & Rau-Göhring, Matthias, 2017. "Determinants of sub-sovereign bond yield spreads – The role of fiscal fundamentals and federal bailout expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 72-98.
    12. Heiko T. Burret & Lars P. Feld, 2016. "Effects of Fiscal Rules - 85 Years' Experience in Switzerland," CESifo Working Paper Series 6063, CESifo.
    13. Jeffrey Clemens & Stan Veuger, 2024. "Intergovernmental Grants and Policy Competition: Concepts, Institutions, and Evidence," NBER Chapters, in: Policy Responses to Tax Competition, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Natalie Cox, 2017. "Pricing, Selection, and Welfare in the Student Loan Market: Evidence from Borrower Repayment Decisions," Working Papers 2017-2, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    15. Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Violeta Vulovic, 2017. "How well do subnational borrowing regulations work?," Chapters, in: Naoyuki Yoshino & Peter J. Morgan (ed.), Central and Local Government Relations in Asia, chapter 5, pages 161-220, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Burret, Heiko T. & Feld, Lars P., 2018. "(Un-)intended effects of fiscal rules," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 166-191.
    17. Bryan Kelly & Hanno Lustig & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2016. "Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply about Sector-Wide Government Guarantees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(6), pages 1278-1319, June.
    18. David Finkelstein & Andreas Strzodka & James Vickery, 2018. "Credit risk transfer and de facto GSE reform," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue 24-3, pages 88-116.
    19. Song Han & Hao Zhou, 2016. "Effects of Liquidity on the Non-Default Component of Corporate Yield Spreads: Evidence from Intraday Transactions Data," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 6(03), pages 1-49, September.
    20. C. Randall HENNING & Martin KESSLER, 2012. "Fiscal Federalism: US History for Architects of Europe’s Fiscal Union," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-31.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Puerto Rican debt crisis; Implicit government guarantees; Failure of market discipline;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:80:y:2023:i:c:s0929119923000585. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.