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Do corporate governance mandates impact long-term firm value and governance culture?

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  • Aggarwal, Reena
  • Schloetzer, Jason D.
  • Williamson, Rohan

Abstract

Motivated by recent changes to corporate governance standards around the world, we use a regulatory shock that substantially altered the governance structure for some firms to shed light on the long-term impact of mandates that are of global interest. Firms affected by this shock had lower values and non-mandated governance practices that were less shareholder friendly before the mandates were in effect when compared to unaffected matched peers. In the post-mandate period, we document a 48% tightening of the relative value gap, and show that this gap relates to the continued use of less shareholder friendly non-mandated governance practices. Our results suggest that governance mandates can tighten, but not eliminate, the value gap between poorly and well governed firms, and that firms affected by the shock continue to have less shareholder friendly governance cultures long after regulatory intervention.

Suggested Citation

  • Aggarwal, Reena & Schloetzer, Jason D. & Williamson, Rohan, 2019. "Do corporate governance mandates impact long-term firm value and governance culture?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 202-217.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:59:y:2019:i:c:p:202-217
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.06.007
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    9. Faozi A. Almaqtari & Tamer Elsheikh & Omar Ikbal Tawfik & Mayada Abd El-Aziz Youssef, 2022. "Exploring the Impact of Sustainability, Board Characteristics, and Firm-Specifics on Firm Value: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom and Turkey," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-27, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; Firm value; Corporate culture; International regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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