IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/corfin/v38y2016icp106-125.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Why do employees like to be paid with Options?: A multi-period prospect theory approach

Author

Listed:
  • Sun, Lei
  • Widdicks, Martin

Abstract

The use of options as compensation for non-executive employees is a puzzle. Standard, rational, valuation models show that the cost of issuing options is larger than the value placed on the options by employees. Existing explanations for this puzzle are based upon static models that ignore the considerable dynamic aspects of employee stock option pricing and exercise behavior. We develop dynamic, multiperiod models of employee preferences considering risk aversion, loss aversion, overconfidence and probability weighting to test possible explanations of the use of employee stock options. We find that a cumulative prospect theory model generates scenarios where employees would prefer options to either cash or equity payments, and also optimally exercise their options early. This is the only model where options are preferred and also optimally exercised early.

Suggested Citation

  • Sun, Lei & Widdicks, Martin, 2016. "Why do employees like to be paid with Options?: A multi-period prospect theory approach," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 106-125.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:38:y:2016:i:c:p:106-125
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.03.002
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119916300268
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.03.002?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lambert, Ra & Larcker, Df & Verrecchia, Re, 1991. "Portfolio Considerations In Valuing Executive-Compensation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(1), pages 129-149.
    2. Ittner, Christopher D. & Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 2003. "The structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 89-127, January.
    3. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February.
    4. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2005. "Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 99-133, April.
    5. Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, 1995. "Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium Puzzle," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 73-92.
    6. Polkovnichenko, Valery & Zhao, Feng, 2013. "Probability weighting functions implied in options prices," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(3), pages 580-609.
    7. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1992. "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 297-323, October.
    8. Carpenter, Jennifer N., 1998. "The exercise and valuation of executive stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 127-158, May.
    9. Ilona Babenko & Yuri Tserlukevich, 2009. "Analyzing the Tax Benefits from Employee Stock Options," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1797-1825, August.
    10. McDonald, Robert L., 2004. "The tax (dis)advantage of a firm issuing options on its own stock," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(5), pages 925-955, April.
    11. Frank D. Hodge & Shiva Rajgopal & Terry Shevlin, 2009. "Do Managers Value Stock Options and Restricted Stock Consistent with Economic Theory?," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 26(3), pages 899-932, September.
    12. Ingolf Dittmann & Ernst Maug & Oliver Spalt, 2010. "Sticks or Carrots? Optimal CEO Compensation when Managers Are Loss Averse," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 65(6), pages 2015-2050, December.
    13. Bettis, J. Carr & Bizjak, John M. & Lemmon, Michael L., 2005. "Exercise behavior, valuation, and the incentive effects of employee stock options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 445-470, May.
    14. Nicholas Barberis, 2012. "A Model of Casino Gambling," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(1), pages 35-51, January.
    15. Carpenter, Jennifer N. & Stanton, Richard & Wallace, Nancy, 2010. "Optimal exercise of executive stock options and implications for firm cost," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 315-337, November.
    16. Kroll, Yoram & Levy, Haim & Rapoport, Amnon, 1988. "Experimental Tests of the Separation Theorem and the Capital Asset Pricing Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 500-519, June.
    17. Shefrin, Hersh & Statman, Meir, 2000. "Behavioral Portfolio Theory," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(2), pages 127-151, June.
    18. Bergman, Nittai K. & Jenter, Dirk, 2007. "Employee sentiment and stock option compensation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(3), pages 667-712, June.
    19. Nicholas Barberis & Ming Huang & Tano Santos, 2001. "Prospect Theory and Asset Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(1), pages 1-53.
    20. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R., 2001. "Stock option plans for non-executive employees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 253-287, August.
    21. D. Andricopoulos, Ari & Widdicks, Martin & Newton, David P. & Duck, Peter W., 2007. "Extending quadrature methods to value multi-asset and complex path dependent options," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 471-499, February.
    22. Spalt, Oliver G., 2013. "Probability Weighting and Employee Stock Options," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 1085-1118, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hana Urbancová & Markéta Šnýdrová, 2017. "Remuneration and Employee Benefits in Organizations in the Czech Republic," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 65(1), pages 357-368.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Martin Widdicks & Jinsha Zhao, 2014. "A Model of Equity Based Compensation with Tax," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(7-8), pages 1002-1041, September.
    2. repec:dau:papers:123456789/13098 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Bahaji, Hamza & Casta, Jean-François, 2016. "Employee stock option-implied risk attitude under Rank-Dependent Expected Utility," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 52(PA), pages 144-154.
    4. Hamza Bahaji, 2009. "Contribution à l'analyse des déterminants du comportement d'exercice des porteurs de stock options : une étude empirique sur le marché Américain," Working Papers halshs-00512840, HAL.
    5. Steffen Brenner, 2015. "The Risk Preferences of U.S. Executives," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1344-1361, June.
    6. Menachem Abudy & Simon Benninga, 2011. "Taxation and the value of employee stock options," International Journal of Managerial Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 7(1), pages 9-37, February.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/9550 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Sautner, Zacharias & Weber, Martin, 2005. "Stock options and employee behavior," Papers 05-26, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    9. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2005. "Accounting, Governance, and Broad-Based Stock Option Grants," Research Papers 1821r1, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    10. Ulrike Malmendier, 2018. "Behavioral Corporate Finance," NBER Working Papers 25162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Kevin F. Hallock & Craig Olson, 2006. "The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees," NBER Working Papers 11950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2006. "Costs of broad-based stock option plans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 511-534, October.
    13. Hamza Bahaji, 2018. "Are employee stock option exercise decisions better explained through the prospect theory?," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 262(2), pages 335-359, March.
    14. Tung-Hsiao Yang & Don M. Chance, 2014. "The Price-Taker Effect On The Valuation Of Executive Stock Options," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 37(1), pages 27-54, February.
    15. Yisong S. Tian, 2020. "Enhancing managerial equity incentives with moving average payoffs," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(10), pages 1562-1583, October.
    16. Francesco Bova & Marshall Vance, 2019. "Uncertainty avoidance and the timing of employee stock option exercise," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(5), pages 740-757, July.
    17. Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-372, June.
    18. Jakusch, Sven Thorsten, 2017. "On the applicability of maximum likelihood methods: From experimental to financial data," SAFE Working Paper Series 148, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, revised 2017.
    19. Jan Zabojnik, 2014. "Stock-based Compensation Plans And Employee Incentives," Working Paper 1325, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    20. Carola Frydman & Dirk Jenter, 2010. "CEO Compensation," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 2(1), pages 75-102, December.
    21. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash," NBER Working Papers 10221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    22. Hodder, James E. & Jackwerth, Jens Carsten, 2011. "Managerial responses to incentives: Control of firm risk, derivative pricing implications, and outside wealth management," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1507-1518, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Employee stock options; Prospect theory; Overconfidence; Early exercise;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing
    • J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:38:y:2016:i:c:p:106-125. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jcorpfin .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.