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Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms

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  • Jordan, Bradford D.
  • Liu, Mark H.
  • Wu, Qun

Abstract

We examine corporate payout policy in dual-class firms. The expropriation hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out less to shareholders because entrenched managers want to maximize the value of assets under control and the associated private benefits. The pre-commitment hypothesis predicts that dual-class firms pay out more to shareholders because firms use corporate payouts as a pre-commitment device to mitigate agency costs. Our results support the pre-commitment hypothesis. Dual-class firms have higher cash dividend payments and total payouts, and they use more regular cash dividends rather than special dividends or repurchases, compared to their propensity-matched single-class firms. Dual-class firms with severe free cash flow-related agency problems and few growth opportunities rely even more on corporate payouts as a pre-commitment mechanism. We also rule out the alternative explanation that dual-class firms pay out more because super-voting shareholders lack the ability to generate home-made dividends by selling shares since super-voting shares are often non-tradable or very illiquid.

Suggested Citation

  • Jordan, Bradford D. & Liu, Mark H. & Wu, Qun, 2014. "Corporate payout policy in dual-class firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 1-19.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:corfin:v:26:y:2014:i:c:p:1-19
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.02.004
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dual class shares; Voting rights; Cash flow rights; Dividends; Payout policy; Stock repurchase;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy

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