IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/chsofr/v123y2019icp254-259.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network

Author

Listed:
  • Han, Dun
  • Yan, Shuting
  • Li, Dandan

Abstract

Considering the ‘antisocial punishment’ and ‘second-order free-riding’ mechanisms, we propose a public goods game model with a punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network. Simulation results show that the maximal fine of punishment has a greater impact on defectors’ strategies than it does on cooperators’ strategies. That is, as the maximal fine of punishment increases, the final density of cooperators fluctuates within a small interval. Interestingly, when the initial density of cooperators is large, leading to a low density of final cooperators. In contrast, when the initial density of cooperators is small, the final cooperative density is relative large. In addition, when the maximal cost of punishment is sufficiently small, the difference between the final density of cooperators, defectors, punishing cooperators, and punishing defectors is not obvious. However, if the maximal cost of punishment exceeds a certain threshold, the density of punishing cooperators is less than that of cooperators. Meanwhile, the density of punishing defectors is greater than that of defectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Han, Dun & Yan, Shuting & Li, Dandan, 2019. "The evolutionary public goods game model with punishment mechanism in an activity-driven network," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 254-259.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:123:y:2019:i:c:p:254-259
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2019.04.015
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960077919301250
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.chaos.2019.04.015?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bochet, Olivier & Page, Talbot & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 11-26, May.
    2. Gächter, Simon & Herrmann, Benedikt, 2011. "The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 193-210, February.
    3. Li, Yumeng & Zhang, Jun & Perc, Matjaž, 2018. "Effects of compassion on the evolution of cooperation in spatial social dilemmas," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 320(C), pages 437-443.
    4. Wang, Qun & Wang, Hanchen & Zhang, Zhuxi & Li, Yumeng & Liu, Yu & Perc, Matjaž, 2018. "Heterogeneous investments promote cooperation in evolutionary public goods games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 502(C), pages 570-575.
    5. C. Y. Zhang & J. L. Zhang & G. M. Xie & L. Wang, 2011. "Coevolving agent strategies and network topology for the public goods games," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 80(2), pages 217-222, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zhang, Peipei & Li, Dandan, 2023. "A generalized public goods game model based on Nash bargaining," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 609(C).
    2. Han, Dun & He, Youxin, 2023. "The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 458(C).
    3. Xu, Wei & Li, Dandan & Han, Dun & Sun, Mei, 2024. "The impact of relationship stickiness and memory on the evolution of individual behavior," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 183(C).
    4. Zeng, Ziyan & Li, Yuhan & Feng, Minyu, 2022. "The spatial inheritance enhances cooperation in weak prisoner’s dilemmas with agents’ exponential lifespan," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 593(C).
    5. Wang, Mengyao & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2020. "The interplay of behaviors and attitudes in public goods game considering environmental investment," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 382(C).
    6. Wang, Chaoqian & Huang, Chaochao, 2022. "Between local and global strategy updating in public goods game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 606(C).
    7. Li, Dandan & Sun, Xiaoxiao & He, Youxin & Han, Dun, 2022. "On prisoner’s dilemma game with psychological bias and memory learning," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 433(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dannenberg,Astrid & Martinsson,Peter, 2015. "The effect of nonbinding agreements on cooperation among forest user groups in Nepal and Ethiopia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7325, The World Bank.
    2. Karakostas, Alexandros & Kocher, Martin G. & Matzat, Dominik & Rau, Holger A. & Riewe, Gerhard, 2023. "The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 73-87.
    3. Chen, Wei & Wang, Jianwei & Yu, Fengyuan & He, Jialu & Xu, Wenshu & Dai, Wenhui, 2024. "Successful initial positioning of non-cooperative individuals in cooperative populations effectively hinders cooperation prosperity," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 462(C).
    4. Chen, Qiao & Chen, Tong & Wang, Yongjie, 2019. "Cleverly handling the donation information can promote cooperation in public goods game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 346(C), pages 363-373.
    5. You, Feng & Yang, Han-Xin & Li, Yumeng & Du, Wenbo & Wang, Gang, 2023. "A modified Vicsek model based on the evolutionary game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 438(C).
    6. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2008. "Reciprocity, culture, and human cooperation: Previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment," Discussion Papers 2008-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Reuben, Ernesto & Riedl, Arno, 2013. "Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 122-137.
    8. Yang, Han-Xin & Yang, Jing, 2019. "Reputation-based investment strategy promotes cooperation in public goods games," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 523(C), pages 886-893.
    9. Grieco, Daniela & Faillo, Marco & Zarri, Luca, 2017. "Enforcing cooperation in public goods games: Is one punisher enough?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 55-73.
    10. Ernesto Reuben & Arno Riedl, 2009. "Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(1), pages 72-93, February.
    11. Dickinson, David L. & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2015. "Norm enforcement in social dilemmas: An experiment with police commissioners," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 74-85.
    12. Faillo, Marco & Grieco, Daniela & Zarri, Luca, 2013. "Legitimate punishment, feedback, and the enforcement of cooperation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 271-283.
    13. Shimpei Koike & Mayuko Nakamaru & Tokinao Otaka & Hajime Shimao & Ken-Ichi Shimomura & Takehiko Yamato, 2018. "Reciprocity and exclusion in informal financial institutions: An experimental study of rotating savings and credit associations," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(8), pages 1-23, August.
    14. Xu, Hedong & Fan, Suohai & Tian, Cunzhi & Xiao, Xinrong, 2019. "Evolutionary investor sharing game on networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 340(C), pages 138-145.
    15. Liu, Chen & Shi, Juan & Li, Tong & Liu, Jinzhuo, 2019. "Aspiration driven coevolution resolves social dilemmas in networks," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 342(C), pages 247-254.
    16. Tingting Fu & Louis Putterman, 2018. "When is punishment harmful to cooperation? A note on antisocial and perverse punishment," Journal of the Economic Science Association, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(2), pages 151-164, December.
    17. Wang, Dongqi & Shuai, Xuanyue & Pan, Qiuhui & Li, Jingye & Lan, Xiaolong & He, Mingfeng, 2020. "Long deliberation times promote cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 537(C).
    18. Cornée, Simon & Masclet, David, 2022. "Long-term relationships, group lending, and peer monitoring in microfinance: Experimental evidence," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 100(C).
    19. Simon Gaechter & Benedikt Herrmann, 2008. "Reciprocity, culture, and human cooperation: Previous insights and a new cross-cultural experiment," Discussion Papers 2008-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    20. Ananish Chaudhuri, 2011. "Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(1), pages 47-83, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:123:y:2019:i:c:p:254-259. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thayer, Thomas R. (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.elsevier.com/chaos-solitons-and-fractals .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.