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Conditional punishment resolves social dilemma in spatial network

Author

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  • Niu, Xiaotong
  • Xu, Jiwei
  • Deng, Zhenghong

Abstract

Social punishment, a mechanism that cooperative individual spends a little cost to penalize defector, is verified to be an effective mechanism for promoting the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we introduce conditional punishment, the willingness to punish p, which decides whether to carry out penalty. It is shown that cooperative behavior is significantly enhanced when punishers are taken into account and the frequency of cooperation increases with p. In addition, we find out the protective effect of punishers on evolution of cooperation from a micro point of view. We hope our work may shed light on understanding of cooperative behavior in society.

Suggested Citation

  • Niu, Xiaotong & Xu, Jiwei & Deng, Zhenghong, 2017. "Conditional punishment resolves social dilemma in spatial network," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 256-259.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chsofr:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:256-259
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2017.10.016
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    Cited by:

    1. Gao, Liyan & Pan, Qiuhui & He, Mingfeng, 2021. "Environmental-based defensive promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 401(C).
    2. Quan, Ji & Yu, Junyu & Li, Xia & Wang, Xianjia, 2023. "Conditional switching between social excluders and loners promotes cooperation in spatial public goods game," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 169(C).
    3. Quan, Ji & Pu, Zhenjuan & Wang, Xianjia, 2021. "Comparison of social exclusion and punishment in promoting cooperation: Who should play the leading role?," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).

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