How China's accession to the WTO affects global welfare?

Conventional wisdom suggests that, if a large nation reduces tariffs, the Rest of the World (RoW) as a whole should immediately experience gains from trade. However, little simulation evidence has been provided to evaluate the welfare effects of China's tariff reduction upon its WTO accession on each of its trade partners. This paper addresses the above issue under both the perfectly competitive model and the monopolistic competition framework à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). Armed by the method of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007, 2008) to quantify the individual countries' responses to the “China (trade liberalization) shock” at equilibrium, we could check the extent to which global welfare benefit from the import tariff reduction after China's entry into the WTO. The quantitative results show that, both China and the RoW benefit from Chinese participation into the WTO, with estimated welfare gains falling in a range of [1.4697%, 3.8743%] and [0.0743%, 0.1015%], respectively. That is to say, about 58.24% of total benefits extracted from China's accession into the WTO worldwide flow to countries other than China under perfect competition; while under monopolistic competition, the whole world enjoys a 0.1571% welfare increases if firms' entry is restricted, of which 42.64% are injected into the RoW, an equivalent amount of 23.3903 billion US dollars. Since allowing for firms' entry and exit would lead to adjustments in both aggregate price indices and government tariff revenues, welfare gains of the world significantly increase (0.2474%), but these adjustments would slightly distort the welfare changes for other countries in the sense that only 36.50%, which is equivalent to 32.1008 billion US dollars, overflow to the RoW. As a result, some countries gain more, while some less.