College admission in three Chinese provinces: Province-specific versus pooling quotas
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DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2019.04.007
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Cited by:
- Sirui Li & Philip Verwimp, 2024. "Standardized Testing for College Entrance: Evidence from a Major Examination Reform in China," Working Papers ECARES 2024-17, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Yang, Yu (Alan), 2024. "On the Spatial Allocation of College Seats: Human Capital Production and the Distribution of Skilled Labor," MPRA Paper 120498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
Keywords
College admission; China;JEL classification:
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
- I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality
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