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College admission in three Chinese provinces: Province-specific versus pooling quotas

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  • Pu, Yun

Abstract

In terms of college admissions in China, each college has a quota for each province. Under this province-specific quota system, students from different provinces do not compete with each other and are not differentiated after admission. As opposed to the pooling quota system, where each college has a quota for multiple provinces, the province-specific quota system may introduce unfairness and inefficiency. In this paper, I thus develop a model to empirically compare the two systems in Guangxi, Hebei, and Sichuan in 2006 and 2007. I find that pooling quotas improve students' welfare and so does combining quotas for more provinces. However, students from some provinces have lower utilities after pooling quotas. Since students are treated equally after pooling, the results indicate the unfairness of the province-specific quota system. All results indicate the government should abandon the province-specific quota system.

Suggested Citation

  • Pu, Yun, 2020. "College admission in three Chinese provinces: Province-specific versus pooling quotas," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:chieco:v:60:y:2020:i:c:s1043951x19300525
    DOI: 10.1016/j.chieco.2019.04.007
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Atila Abdulkadiro?lu & Yeon-Koo Che & Yosuke Yasuda, 2015. "Expanding "Choice" in School Choice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 1-42, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yang, Yu (Alan), 2024. "On the Spatial Allocation of College Seats: Human Capital Production and the Distribution of Skilled Labor," MPRA Paper 120498, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Sirui Li & Philip Verwimp, 2024. "Standardized Testing for College Entrance: Evidence from a Major Examination Reform in China," Working Papers ECARES 2024-17, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    College admission; China;

    JEL classification:

    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • I24 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Inequality

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